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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the vulnerability of the European air transport network to major airport closures from the 
perspective of the delays imposed to disrupted airline passengers. Using an MIDT dataset on passenger 
itineraries flown during February 2013, full-day individual closures of the 25 busiest European airports are 
simulated and disrupted passengers then relocated to minimum-delay itineraries. Aggregate delays are used to 
rank the criticality of each airport to the network, with the possibility of disaggregating the impact across 
geographical markets. The results provide useful reference values for the development of policies aimed at 
improving the resilience of air transport networks.  
Keywords: Air transport networks, resilience, criticality, passenger recovery. 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Air transport networks are vulnerable to external events, even those that only have a local 
impact. For example, a single airport closure due to poor weather conditions or an industrial 
action may affect the network’s overall performance. The final impact can range from a few 
delays and missed connections to significant economic losses (Mazzocchi et al., 2010). One 
of the possible reasons behind this vulnerability is that ensuring resilient operations has been 
secondary to profit maximization and other geopolitical factors in airline network 
development during the last decades (Lordan et al., 2014b). On top of that, predicted rates of 
growth in air transport demand (ICAO, 2013) in combination with large shocks such as 9/11, 
or the 2010 Volcanic Ash Cloud, can reduce the ability to cope with such disturbances and 
put additional pressures on air transport networks (Cardillo et al., 2013). Within this context, 
reducing the vulnerability and improving the resilience of transport networks has been 
recognized by the European Commission as a high level goal for 2050 (EC, 2014a). 
There is a decent body of literature on the resilience of air transport that largely employs 
complex network theory to analyse the topological properties of airline networks and their 
implications in terms of vulnerability to airport failures or the closure of air corridors. There 
is a disconnection, however, between these analyses and the actual impact of air transport 
disruptions on the final users (i.e. the passengers that experience travel delays). Indeed, only 
few of these studies consider the important aspect of how airlines relocate disrupted 
passengers and, to the best of our knowledge, no previous paper uses actual passenger 
demand data to that end. This situation contrasts with a richer literature in other modes, such 
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as rail or road, where the analysis of resilience and vulnerability is more developed, and the 
implications in terms of direct cost to the user (e.g. travel delays) in the event of a disruption 
in service have been modelled in more detail (e.g. Jenelius et al., 2006). 
Thus, this paper builds upon the concepts developed in previous studies with the objective to 
develop a new method to incorporate demand data into the assessment of vulnerability of the 
European air transport network to major airport closures. Using a Market Information Data 
Transfer dataset (commonly known as MIDT) on passenger itineraries during February 2013, 
full-day individual closures of the 25 busiest European airports are simulated and disrupted 
passengers are relocated to the delay-minimizing itineraries where seat capacity is available. 
A multi-layered network is constructed, where airlines are only able to relocate passengers 
within their own alliances’ flight networks. Vulnerability is measured by the aggregate delays 
imposed to the disrupted passengers as well as the amount of unsatisfied demand in each 
closure scenario. This allows us to rank the most critical airports in the European network. In 
addition, we can disaggregate the impact on geographical markets (with special focus on 
passengers travelling in routes within the European Economic Area, from now on “intra-
EEA” routes). Information on how the traffic is redistributed under each scenario is provided 
as well, leading to an exploratory discussion on the main drivers of airport criticality. The 
results aim to complement the stream of literature that employs complex network theory to 
the same end and also provide useful reference values for the development of policies aimed 
to reduce the vulnerability and improve the resilience of air transport networks. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review on the 
analysis of resilience and vulnerability of air transport networks and discusses our 
contribution. Section 3 describes the supply and demand datasets. Then, the methodological 
process is explained, with particular focus on the passenger relocation algorithm. Section 4 
presents the results and discusses their main implications. Finally, Section 5 summarizes our 
findings, addresses the limitations of our model, and proposes new paths for future research. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONTRIBUTION 
2.1 Basic definitions 
Vulnerability is a concept that is complementary to the ideas of resilience1, robustness, or 
reliability. Vulnerability was defined by Berdica (2002) as the “susceptibility of a system to 
experience disruptions that can affect its functionality”. In the context of a transportation 
network, functionality can be understood as operability or serviceability, i.e. the possibility of 
using any node of link of the network during a given period. As noted by Jenelius et al., 
(2006), this definition of vulnerability can be linked to the general concept of risk and thus 
disaggregated in two components: 1) the probability of the disruptive event occurring, and 2) 
the consequences of the disruptive event (system damage). Given the difficulties in 
estimating the probabilities of extreme events, such as natural disasters or terrorist attacks, 
authors like Berdica (2002) or D’Este and Taylor (2003) argue that measuring the magnitude 
of consequences should be the primary focus of vulnerability studies. This leads to the 
concept of “conditional vulnerability”, defined as the measurement of system damage given 
that the disruptive event occurs.  
It is also possible to measure the criticality of a certain component of the system, such as any 
particular nodes or links. A critical component has a high probability of failure and creates a 
large amount of damage if removed. In parallel to above, ignoring the probability of failure in 
                                                 
1 Rose (2007) defined resilience as the ability of a system to maintain functionality when disrupted, with 
particular focus on the speed at which the system returns to normal 
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the analysis gives rise to the concept of “conditional criticality” defined by Jenelius et al., 
(2006), as the measurement of the damage caused by the failure of the relevant component. 
2.2 Previous studies 
The resilience and vulnerability of network systems has been an area of great interest because 
strategic economic sectors such as energy, utilities, transport, or telecommunications are 
dependent on networks to function. In regards to transport networks, Faturechi and Miller-
Hooks, (2015) list approximately 200 published works on a wide range of modes, including 
metro/subway systems (e.g. Derrible and Kennedy, 2010; Li and Kim, 2014; D’Lima and 
Medda, 2015); maritime transport (e.g. Berle et al., 2011; Thekdi and Santos, 2015: port 
operations; Ducruet et al., 2010: liner shipping; DiPietro et al., 2014: inland waterways); rail 
(e.g. De los Santos et al., 2012; Cacchiani et al., 2014; Rodríguez-Núñez and García-
Palomares, 2014); road (e.g. Chen et al., 2002; Jenelius et al., 2006; Jenelius and Mattsson, 
2012; El-Rashidy and Grant-Muller, 2014; Cats and Jenelius, 2015); air transport (covered 
below); and finally, there have also been attempts at developing models for intermodal 
resilient operations (e.g. Chen and Miller-Hooks, 2012). 
After a comprehensive review of studies, Mattsson and Jenelius (2015) described two main 
approaches to measure vulnerability of transport networks: a) topological vulnerability, and 
b) system-based vulnerability. 
In the topological vulnerability approach, the network is represented as an abstract graph and 
the researcher measures system damage as a result of changes in network topology after a 
disruption affects one or more nodes or links. This type of approach typically uses only 
supply data on available infrastructure and service frequencies. The topological properties of 
networks are characterised by indicators such as average shortest path or degree distribution, 
which determine how the network will be classified within a number of generic structures. 
The study of Zhang et al. (2015) analyses of 17 different network structures, concluding that 
factors such as a higher average degree (i.e. more well-connected nodes), structural 
redundancies2, and excess capacity reduce the vulnerability of transport networks.  
In the system-based vulnerability approach, the network graph is complemented with 
information on actual or predicted traffic flows, and the interaction between supply and 
demand under disruptions is modelled, for example, with a user re-routing algorithm. 
Examples of this system-based approach can be found in Jenelius et al. (2006), De los Santos 
et al. (2012), or Rodríguez-Núñez and García-Palomares (2014), where road and rail network 
vulnerability under a variety of disrupting scenarios is measured according to the total delays 
experienced by the users, who need to alter their original itineraries, as well as the amount of 
unsatisfied demand. This second approach is the one we prefer. The reason is that it allows us 
to obtain a more detailed measurement of “conditional vulnerability” and “conditional 
criticality”, as defined in the previous subsection, since the consequences for the users (in 
terms of travel costs) are now directly quantified.  
Most of the studies on vulnerability and resilience of air transport networks employ a supply-
based topological approach (e.g., Zanin and Lillo, 2013; Lordan et al., 2014a). By using a 
network characterisation of airports as nodes and air corridors as links (either weighted or 
unweighted by capacity), airline networks can be classified according to their topological 
properties. In an air transport context, hub-and-spoke networks are generally considered to 
have “scale-free” properties (i.e. concentrated around large nodes) while point-to-point 
                                                 
2 The concept of structural redundancy is linked to the network’s cyclicity. For example, a circular subway 
network can maintain functionality even if one station closes (Derrible and Kennedy, 2010). 
4 
 
networks lean more towards to the “small-world” class3 (Zanin and Lillo, 2013). Studies such 
as Guimerà et al. (2005), Guida and Maria (2007), Reggiani et al. (2010), Wang et al. (2011) 
and Zeng et al. (2011) apply these methods to identify the respective network’s most relevant 
airports, which are generally those with highest degree centrality (i.e., largest number of 
destinations), closeness (i.e. shortest average distance to all other airports) or betweenness 
centrality (i.e., lying in the largest number of shortest-paths between other airport pairs). 
By analysing the evolution of these indicators in the Brazilian network over 12 years, Rocha 
(2009) found that large airports gain importance over time as airlines move capacity to the 
most profitable routes. However, as network concentration around pivotal nodes increases so 
does the network’s vulnerability, mainly as a result of the lack of structural redundancies that 
support recovery of traffic flows via alternative routings (Zhang et al., 2015). Hence, while 
“scale-free” networks are considered to be more resilient to random failures, this comes at the 
cost of higher vulnerability to targeted attacks to their most central nodes (Albert et al., 
2000). In this regard, the recent years have seen a growing interest in measuring the damage 
caused by the removal of nodes (i.e. airport closures) and/or links (i.e. air corridors) in order 
to determine the network’s vulnerability to these events.  
The purely topological approach to assess this damage in air transport networks does not 
explicitly take into account the need to redistribute the disrupted traffic. The study by Chi and 
Cai (2004) for the US airport network analyses how the main topological indicators change 
after nodes or links are removed. They found that removing the top 10% most connected 
airports would reduce network efficiency by 25%. Lordan et al. (2014a) modeled the global 
airport network with unweighted links and developed a measure of the damage produced by 
both random failures and targeted attacks based on the number of disconnected airports that 
result from them. Betweenness centrality is used as one of the selection criteria for targeted 
attacks. Results are similar to those obtained by Guimerà et al. (2005) in which the most 
critical airports turn out to be the largest and best connected (e.g. Frankfurt, Paris, or 
Amsterdam) as well as the main gateways to isolated areas (e.g. Anchorage, Tahiti). Janic 
(2015) relied on disconnected flights as a measure of network damage, also leading to the 
aforementioned conclusion that larger airports (i.e. Atlanta in the case of 2012 Hurricane 
Sandy) tend to be the most critical. More recently, Lordan et al. (2015) analysed the 
resilience of the global airline alliance networks using similar topological indicators, 
concluding that Star Alliance is the most resilient, followed by SkyTeam and Oneworld. One 
of the main reasons is that the Star Alliance network has a more continuous distribution of 
degree and betweenness centrality among its constituent airports, while the other alliances are 
dominated by few large hubs. In that regard, the degree of vulnerability of the dominating 
alliance is expected to be one of the main predictors of airport criticality. 
A system-based approach to assess network resilience incorporates information on passenger 
flows in order to model the disruption costs from the user’s perspective. To that end, any 
relevant model would need to replicate the challenges arising from irregular airline 
operations, with particular focus on the recovery of aircraft, crews, and passengers in an 
optimal (i.e. cost-minimizing) fashion. As noted by Barnhart (2009), there are a number of 
strategies that airlines can use to adjust schedule operations, including delaying and 
cancelling flights, reassigning aircraft or crews to different routes, and relocating disrupted 
passengers. All these adjustments are subject to a number of restrictions, including crew work 
rules, maintenance schedules, and aircraft and passenger positioning. There is a large body of 
literature devoted to providing efficient methods to solve these optimization problems under 
different scenarios (e.g., Yan and Lin, 1997; Lettovsky et al., 2000; Abdelghany et al. 2008; 
                                                 
3 Real-life air transport networks, however, can also present mixed characteristics (Guimerà et al., 2005). 
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Bratu and Barnhart, 2006; Petersen et al., 2012, and Maher, 2015) as well as measuring the 
costs of these disruptions for airlines and passengers (e.g., Schavell, 2000; Allan et al., 2001; 
Schaefer and Millner, 2001; Janic, 2005; Khol et al., 2007; Janic, 2015). From the passenger 
perspective, there are different cost measures, including the number of passengers affected 
(missed connections and cancellations), the proportion of those relocated, and the total delay 
experienced, measured by the difference between the original and rescheduled itineraries 
(Bratu and Barnhart, 2006). These measures of user costs are, in essence, the same ones 
defined by Jenelius et al., (2006) to represent system damage in their road network study. 
In the intersection between the topological and the system-based approach, there is a 
relatively recent stream of literature that focuses on measuring the changes in network 
topology as a result of passenger rescheduling. However, none of the published studies so far 
use detailed demand data and, instead, passenger flows are either inferred from the existing 
capacity, or they are only available at a flight sector level (without knowing the passengers’ 
full itineraries). For simplicity, these studies retain a view of air transport networks as 
isolated components of overall transport networks. The goal is to determine how vulnerable 
the provision of air transport is in a particular country or region without considering the 
possibility of switching to other transport modes in case of an external shock. Cardillo et al. 
(2013), working with the European network, developed a passenger rescheduling algorithm 
and determined the change in the network’s topological indicators after simulating random 
failures and assigning the disrupted passengers to alternative itineraries. They define a multi-
layered network, with each layer representing an individual airline’s flight network. In order 
to make the rescheduling more realistic, passenger recovery options within the same layer are 
given priority. Results show that the definition of a multi-layered structure negatively affects 
the measures of network resilience as it effectively restricts the options for passenger 
relocation. Also relevant is the contribution by Hossain et al. (2013) for Australian airports, 
where variables such as airport capacity and ground transfers between airports were included 
in the rescheduling algorithm. They estimated the unit cost of relocation associated to each 
airport closure as a measure of airport criticality and then ranked the airports according to 
that dimension. They found a high correlation (78%+) between the relocation costs and the 
indicators of degree and betweenness centrality. In spite of that, the impact of a closure can 
be mitigated by having close surrogate airports to serve the stranded passengers. 
2.3 A new method using demand data 
Our paper builds on the last two contributions (i.e., Cardillo et al., (2013) and Hossain et al. 
(2013)) in which a system-based approach to measure network vulnerability is undertaken, 
though with a much stronger methodological focus on passenger relocation than on the 
analysis of network topology. In addition, we adapt Jenelius et al. (2006) concepts to an air 
transport context by measuring system vulnerability and node criticality according to 
passenger delays and unsatisfied demand conditional to different disruption scenarios. 
Furthermore, we maintain the simplifying view of air transport networks as an isolated 
component, meaning that the passengers in our model will not fully substitute air travel by 
road or rail. Nevertheless, we do consider ground transport for broadening the set of 
alternatives available to disrupted passengers and aspects like intermodal integration can help 
to explain how vulnerable airline operations are at a particular airport.  
The present study adds to the literature in four key areas. The first and most important is the 
development of an enhanced relocation algorithm where disrupted passengers are offered 
options that cover their entire journey. This is only possible because we use demand data to 
characterise traffic flows within the European Air Transport Network. In addition, it is 
possible, for the first time, to disaggregate the network impact according to different 
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origin/destination markets, with particular focus on the intra-European market which is of 
great interest for EU policy-makers. The second novelty is the use of a multi-layered network 
defined at an alliance/partnership level (as recommended by Cardillo et al., 2013; and Zanin, 
2015). The reason is that a significant proportion of bookings in our dataset are operated by 
two or more airline partners and, hence, the individual airlines’ flight networks may not be 
able to provide relocation alternatives. Thirdly, we provide the first ranking of airport 
criticality within the European network based on non-topological measures of network 
damage. Finally, we also aim to explore the main drivers of airport criticality under our new 
approach and discuss how the main conclusions from the existing body of research on 
topological vulnerability of air transport networks relate to our results. 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Scope of analysis and methodological stages 
In this paper, “European airports” are defined as those located in any country that is totally or 
partially in Europe. European airports can be split between European Economic Area (EEA) 
and non-EEA members. Switzerland is included in the EEA group. The European air 
transport network is characterised by all worldwide air passengers that travel through at least 
one European airport during a certain period. These concepts, along with the datasets 
described below, delimit the geographical and temporal dimensions of this study.  
In regards to methodology, the whole process can be split in three stages. First, we generate a 
baseline scenario by assigning a flight combination with a minimum travel time for each 
observed passenger itinerary. Second, we simulate the closure of one major airport and the 
affected passengers are sequentially relocated in delay-minimizing alternative itineraries 
within a predefined network, taking into account capacity constraints and allowing for ground 
transfers between airports. Third, the non-relocation rate and the aggregate delay are used as 
measures of network damage generated by the particular airport closure.    
3.2 Datasets 
The proposed method combines supply (schedules and seats) and demand data (passenger 
itineraries). The supply side is covered by a dataset of worldwide flight schedules during the 
first week of February 2013, for which the primary source is the OAG Schedules dataset. 
This time period was chosen as major airport closures in Europe are typically linked to 
adverse weather conditions during the North Hemisphere winter season4. After simple data 
processing, the supply dataset comprises 558,503 unique records of scheduled passenger 
flight departures for 755 airlines that offered 74.2 million seats across a network of 2,101 
commercial airports. Each record indicates the operating airline, alliance membership (if 
applicable), flight number, origin and destination airport codes, aircraft type, number of seats, 
flight distance, and Universal Time Coordinated (UTC) departure and arrival times.  
The demand side is covered by a Marketing Information Data Transfer (MIDT) dataset 
containing air passenger itineraries flown during February 2013. Each record contains 
information on the published airline, as well as the points of origin and destination, the 
connecting airports (up to two intermediate stops), and the number of passengers. The 
airports of origin and destination determine the market to which the passengers belong. Most 
markets can be served via different itineraries, depending on the points of connection. In 
total, the MIDT dataset contains 424,155 different itineraries in 135,078 directed markets, 
involving 47.1 million passengers, 441 airlines, and 2,150 airports (454 from the European 
Economic Area). Table 1 shows the distribution of this passenger demand by geographical 
                                                 
4 An additional simulation was run for August 2013 in order to discuss the robustness of our results. 
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markets. The largest market served by the European airport network is the intra-EEA, which 
amounts to 56.4% of its total passenger traffic. When non-EEA countries are also considered, 
the total share of intra-European traffic rises to 70.3%. Of the remaining network traffic, 
28,6% is devoted to linking Europe with the rest of the world, with the most important 
destinations being Asia-Pacific and North America. The remaining 1.1% of passengers make 
use of European airports as gateways during their journeys between other continents. Note 
that Europe has a small presence in each continent pair, except the intra-American ones. 
Table 1. Distribution of passenger demand by geographical markets (February 2013) 
(passengers travelling between) 
EEA Rest of 
Europe  
(non-EEA) 
Africa Asia-Pacific Latin 
America and 
Caribbean 
Middle East North America 
EEA 26,585,156 2,593,487 2,268,371 3,201,116 1,406,508 1,704,083 2,494,909 
Rest of Europe (non-EEA) 
 
3,949,195 137,187 1,323,383 83,527 672,892 204,223 
Africa 
  
5,401 20,580 7,783 20,833 79,903 
Asia-Pacific 
   
11,892 36,349 19,526 134,450 
Latin America and Caribbean 
    
0 26,243 0 
Middle East 
     
1,698 108,486 
North America 
      
0 
Source: MIDT, own elaboration. Note: EEA: European Economic Area. 
The original sources of information for the MIDT dataset are Global Distributions Systems 
(GDSs) such as Galileo, Sabre, or Amadeus, among others. According to ARG (2013), 44% 
of all bookings of major airlines were done through GDSs in 2012. The proportion increases 
to 55% for network airlines, while low-cost carriers (LCCs), that prefer direct sales, only get 
16% of their bookings via GDSs. This imbalance is an important limitation of the original 
dataset, as low-cost carriers may be underrepresented. In order to correct that, the provider of 
our data (OAG Traffic Analyser) adjusted the market figures using mathematical algorithms 
based on frequencies and supplied seats in each flight sector. The reliability of these 
adjustments, in terms of LCC representation, can be judged by calculating the airline market 
shares in the intra-EEA market that result from our adjusted data. The combined market share 
of LCCs is approximately 44%, which is similar to the estimate provided by the European 
Commission for the common market in 2013 (EC, 2014b). Other past studies have also used 
this dataset for connectivity purposes (e.g, Suau-Sánchez et al., 2014, 2015).  
Finally, the proposed method requires of three additional datasets: 1) a full list of alliance, 
codeshare, and interline partners for each published airline in the MIDT file. Alliance 
membership is broadly defined to include subsidiaries of member airlines that are not 
specifically named as affiliate members.5 This information was obtained both from OAG and 
the airlines’ websites; 2) Airport-specific minimum connecting times for the 250 busiest 
airports in terms of connecting traffic6, including around 68,000 airline-specific exceptions. 
This was obtained from the OAG Connections Analyser; and 3) Minimum ground transfer 
times between the 50 largest airports in the European network and their potential surrogates. 
The surrogates are defined as the airports located less than 130 min of uncongested road/rail 
transfer from a given airport. This represents the best road/rail travel time corresponding to 
the shortest scheduled flights at Europe’s largest airports. The goal is to prevent road/rail 
transport to become a full alternative to air travel within the context of this paper. The travel 
times were easily obtained by using Google Maps.  
3.2 Creating the baseline scenario  
Although the MIDT dataset provides information on passenger itineraries, it does not indicate 
the actual flights taken by the passengers nor their travel times. Therefore, there is need to 
match each MIDT record with flight schedules from the OAG dataset in order to create a 
                                                 
5 For example, Vueling is considered part of the Oneworld network for the purposes of passenger recovery. 
6 This sample covers 95%+ of passengers connections in the MIDT file. 
8 
 
baseline scenario. Due to the difference in time spans (demand data is for a month and 
schedules are for a week), the first step is to adjust the MIDT data in order to account for one 
week’s traffic (dividing passengers by four).  
Table 2. Sample MIDT record (1st week of February 2013) 
Published Airline Origin Gateway 1 Gateway 2 Destination Passengers 
IB (Iberia) LPA (Gran Canaria) MAD (Madrid) - LHR (Heathrow) 70 
For each adjusted MIDT record (Table 2), a search is made in the OAG file for all relevant 
flights (i.e. LPA to MAD and MAD to LHR) that were operated by either the published 
airline or any of its partners during the sample week. In case the airline filters do not return 
any matches, the search is broadened to include all airlines7.  
If the itinerary involves more than one sector, flight connections are built on the following 
restrictions, adapted from Grosche (2009): a) the published minimum connecting times must 
be met, b) the maximum connecting time is arbitrarily set at one hour above the shortest valid 
connection time8, c) passengers on each first-leg flight always prefer the alternative with the 
shortest travel time, and d) passengers on each final-leg flight also prefer the shortest travel 
times. The process is illustrated in Table 3 below. The four shortest connections are discarded 
because they do not meet the minimum connecting times set by Madrid airport for Domestic-
International transfers between the sample airlines. As a result, the shortest valid connection 
is 65 min and the maximum connecting time is set as 125 min. The third condition discards 
all the underlined connections because a shorter alternative is available for the first-leg 
passengers. Finally, we also discard the connection in italics (18:05-20:10) because the 
second-leg flight can be reached by a later arrival.  
Table 3. Selected flight connections for the sample MIDT record (only Monday flights) 
Connecting times (min) MAD-LHR 
 
LP
A
-M
A
D
 arrival\departure  10:45 12:40 13:35 14:20 14:55 15:00 15:55 16:50 17:10 18:30 20:10 20:45 06:45
+1 
10:30 15 130 185 230 265 270 325 380 400 480 580 615 1,215 
14:50 
    
5 10 65 120 140 220 320 355 955 
18:05 
         
35 125 170 770 
19:00 
          
70 105 705 
22:25 
            
500 
Notes: Minimum Connecting Time= 45-55 min (depending on arrival and departure terminals). Bold indicates selected connections. 
The outcome of this selection process will be a baseline scenario in which passengers take the 
best connections available, leading to minimum travel times. We acknowledge that this is 
somewhat unrealistic in the sense that passengers may trade off longer connection times for 
cheaper fares or more convenient flight times, thus spending more time at the hub airport than 
the minimum necessary to complete their trip. On the other hand, these “inflated” connection 
times may compromise the measures of network damage by introducing a substantial element 
of travel time savings as a result of passenger rescheduling (i.e., a passenger with a 6-hour 
extended connection at a closed hub may be given a 1-hour connection in an alternate airport 
instead). Hence, while a more complex modeling of passenger flight choice is slated for 
future research, for this initial application a “minimum travel time” baseline scenario is 
considered an appropriate benchmark to provide measures that can be easily interpreted. 
Once the suitable flights (or flight combinations) are selected, the number of passengers in 
the MIDT record is distributed among them according to seat capacity (Table 4), which is 
determined by the minimum number of seats across all sectors. The proportion of passengers 
                                                 
7 If there were no scheduled flights for any of the relevant sectors, the MIDT record is discarded. 
8 This is meant to allow for some variability in connection times across the sample week. The goal is to prevent 
all passengers being allocated to the best weekly connection, which, in early simulations, usually led to capacity 
problems and important computational costs. Changing this window to 2 hours increases the sample-wide 
average connecting time only in 2.5% (approx. 3-4 min) due to the effect of other restrictions. 
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allocated to each travel option is equal to the proportion of its seat capacity to total capacity9. 
Total travel times for each flight combination that has received at least one passenger are 
added to the baseline scenario for the analysis of network vulnerability. 
Table 4. Allocation of demand to flight combinations and generation of travel times for the baseline scenario 
ID 
  Flight 1: LPA-MAD  Flight 2: MAD-LHR Full itinerary . 
 Day Airline Flight No. Dep. Arr.  Seats  Airline Flight No. Dep. Arr.  Seats 
Seat 
capacity Pax. 
Travel 
Time (m) 
1 Mon I2 3925 11:15 14:50 150  IB 3166 15:55 17:20 200 150 4 365 2 Mon IB 823 15:10 19:00 200  BA 463 20:10 21:30 254 200 5 380 
3 Tue I2 3925 11:15 14:50 150  IB 3166 15:55 17:20 342 150 4 365 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... . ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
17 Sun IB 823 15:10 19:00 200   BA 463 20:10 21:30 254 200 5 380 
                        Total 2,875 70   
After a first round of processing, the records in the baseline scenario are aggregated by flight 
number and departure date in order to check whether the number of passengers in all 
origin/destination markets assigned to each individual flight does not exceed the seat capacity 
of the aircraft. Passengers over capacity are taken out of the baseline scenario10 and brought 
into new rounds of processing with updated seat capacities in the OAG file11. For this paper, 
three sequential rounds were enough to ensure that 95.8% of all passengers were allocated. 
Table 5. Outcome of the passenger allocation process 
Status Passengers Share 
Allocated-first round 10,915,521 92.70% 
Allocated-second round 313,914 2.67% 
Allocated-third round 56,344 0.48% 
Total Allocated 11,285,779 95.85% 
No Schedules 318,840 2.71% 
No valid Connections 59,609 0.51% 
Over Capacity 110,683 0.94% 
Total Passengers 11,774,911 100.00% 
Allocated passengers only   
Non-stop trips 8,883,646 78.72% 
Connecting trips 2,402,133 21.28% 
1-stop 2,326,103 96.83% 
2-stops 76,030 3.17% 
Inline 1,487,645 61.93% 
Intra-alliance 563,978 23.48% 
Inter-alliance 67,413 2.81% 
Other interline 283,097 11.79% 
The remainder of passenger bookings (4.2%) had to be discarded for different reasons (See 
Table 5): 2.7% did not have any schedules for at least one of its sectors, 0.9% were over 
capacity, and 0.5% of the proposed itineraries did not match to any valid connections. These 
lost records can be explained by the fact that, while OAG schedules belong to the actual week 
under study, MIDT traffic represents an average week in February. Therefore, it may include 
itineraries flown in any of the other weeks. Further exploration of the data indicates that 85% 
of connecting trips in our sample are predicted to have been served entirely within the 
respective alliances, with the remaining 15% relying upon individual interlining and 
codeshare agreements signed by the carriers, regardless of their alliance membership. 
Finally, in order to assess the reliability of this stage, we check the predicted load factors in 
intra-European flights that result from our baseline scenario and compare them with the 
actual ones reported for February 2013 by the Association of European Airlines (AEA) and 
the largest individual carriers. These are reported in Table 6. The predicted load factors for 
                                                 
9 In order not to lose or gain passengers due to rounding, results are rounded up or down randomly until all 
passengers in the MIDT record were allocated, giving preference to the fastest flight combinations.  
10 The passenger numbers in those records involving flights over capacity are scaled down in the same exact 
proportion needed to bring the overall passengers to the level of full capacity. 
11 Full flights are also taken out of the OAG file, leading to different flight connections being built in the 
second- and subsequent stages. Once the popular best-daily-connections are likely to be full, the excess demand 
is more likely to be allocated to longer off-peak connections (i.e. the 10:30-12:40 transfer in Table 3). 
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our week are roughly similar to the actual ones for the entire month, and successfully 
discriminate between carriers, with LCCs having largest load factors than network airlines. 
Table 6. Predicted load factors in intra-European routes (1st week of February 2013) 
Association of European Airlines 
(AEA) Members 
ASK (million) RPK (million) 
 Load Factor 
 Predicted Reported Feb-2013 
Europe Domestic 1,236.3 757.8  61.3% 66.6% 
Europe Cross-border 4,633.7 3,126.8  67.5% 69.3% 
Europe Total 5,870.0 3,884.7  66.2% 68.7% 
Major Carriers 
  
 
  Ryanair 1,475.3 1,097.0  74.4% 77.0%
Easyjet 1,083.9 939.4  86.7% 90.5% 
Air France-KLM Group 1,132.6 775.8  68.5% 68.6% 
Lufthansa Passenger Airlines 1,036.6 685.1  66.1% 66.0% 
SAS group 456.4 288.0  63.1% 66.9% 
International Airlines Group 853.4 569.4  66.7% 69.5% 
Norwegian Air Shuttle 436.5 330.2  75.6% 78.3% 
Air Berlin 488.1 402.7  82.5% 85.3% 
Sources: Airlines’ and AEA websites. Own elaboration. ASK: Availble seat-kilometers, RPK: Revenue passenger kilometers 
The datasets with the baseline scenario and the predicted load factors for all individual flights 
are brought forward to the next stage. 
3.3 Airport closures and passenger rescheduling 
An airport closure is characterised by a vector including the airport code and the times of 
beginning and end of the closure. The passenger itineraries from the baseline scenario and the 
predicted load factors are checked against the parameters of the airport closure. Using a 
similar approach than Janic (2015), all flights scheduled to arrive at12 or depart from a closed 
airport are labelled as “OFF”. Of all remaining flights, those already at full capacity are 
labelled as “FULL” and the rest are “ON”. For each record in the baseline scenario, the 
itineraries to be considered for rescheduling include: 1) all “OFF” flights, 2) all “ON” or 
“FULL” flights departing after an “OFF” flight (i.e. passengers are rescheduled to the end of 
their trip), 3) all “ON” or “FULL” flights preceding an “OFF” flight but still departing within 
the period of closure.13 Every disrupted demand record is compiled in a rescheduling matrix 
that indicates the number of passengers, the first flight in their itinerary to be rescheduled, 
and the final destination of their trip. This matrix is sorted by the departure time of the 
indicated flight in order to establish the sequence in which passengers will be relocated. 
From the perspective of the airlines, two different passenger recovery options are considered: 
1) relocation via the remaining flights in the affected airline’s alliance network, where 
applicable14, and 2) unrestricted relocation (passengers can be relocated in suitable flights 
operated by all airlines). For simplicity, only remaining “ON” flights can be used for 
passenger recovery and all retain their original schedules15. In addition, there is the possibility 
                                                 
12 For simplicity, we do not consider the implications of being caught by the closure mid-flight. However, since 
the closures used in this paper start at midnight, the number of flights affected by this is relatively small. 
13 For example, if the itinerary is A→B→C→D and airport C is closed, the passengers will be considered for 
rescheduling when they are at airport A if the closure is already known at the time of their A→B departure. This 
gives the airline the opportunity to look for an alternative routing as soon as possible in order to minimize delay 
(note that this optimal routing may end up including the A→B flight anyway). If the A→B flight departs before 
the beginning of the closure of C, then the passengers will be considered for rescheduling when they are at B. 
Responsibility for relocation is given to the airline that operates the first flight in the affected sequence. 
14 For non-alliance members, the relocation is made via the remaining flights in the affected airline’s own flight 
network (including their parent airline and subsidiaries, where applicable). Airline-specific IROPS guidelines, 
which specify the preferred partners for flight relocation under irregular operations, were not implemented due 
to computational restrictions. 
15 In the absence of data on aircraft registration numbers, there is no practical way of determining the additional 
flights that would need to be cancelled due to the aircraft being grounded in the closed airport. The introduction 
of congestion and schedule delays is left for future research. 
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of transferring to other airports by ground transport with the objective to make flight 
connections or end the journey. The model, however, does not contemplate the option of 
entirely substituting air travel by ground travel. This is consistent with the current goal of 
measuring how well the European air transport network, taken as an isolated component of 
the overall European transport network, is able to absorb major shocks. 
Table 7. Rules for the calculation of directed time distances 
Origin  
Node 
Destination  
Node 
Conditions Time distance 
ON or FULL  
flight 
ON  
flight 
The origin flight can connect to any future onward journey 
that departs from its destination airport or from a valid 
surrogate of the latter. In both cases, the recovery networks 
of both flights must be compatible (i.e. alliance or 
unrestricted), there must be enough connecting time, and the 
onward flight must not come back to the initial airport. 
 
= Departure Time Destination flight - 
Departure Time Origin flight 
ON or FULL  
flight 
OFF or FULL  
flight 
An "OFF" or "FULL" is not a valid onward journey for 
passengers that are being relocated from other flights. 
 
Not defined 
ON or FULL  
flight 
GRT or END 
node 
There is always a time distance if the END/GRT airport is 
the destination of the origin flight. 
 
= Arrival Time Origin flight - Departure 
Time Origin flight 
OFF  
flight 
ON  
flight 
The stranded passengers can connect to any future onward 
journey that departs from a valid surrogate of the closed 
airport or from the latter when it reopens, provided the 
recovery networks of both flights are compatible and there is 
enough connecting time. 
 
= Departure Time Destination flight - 
Departure Time Origin flight 
OFF  
flight 
OFF or FULL  
flight 
An "OFF" or "FULL" flight is not a valid onward journey 
for passengers that are being relocated from other flights. 
 
Not defined 
OFF  
flight 
GRT or END 
node 
 
Two consecutive ground transfers are not allowed. An END 
node can only be reached from an "ON" or "FULL" origin 
flight or by means of a ground transfer. 
 
Not defined 
GRT node - There is a time distance if and only if the destination node is 
an END node of a valid surrogate of the GRT airport. 
= Ground Transfer Time between GRT and 
END airports (replaced by zero if both 
airports serve the same city) 
The search for alternative routings for passenger recovery will be governed by the objective 
of delay-minimization as it is common under irregular airline operations (Barnhart, 2009)16. 
To that end, a standard shortest-path-length algorithm will be adapted to our case study and 
applied on a directed distance matrix where the distance between origin nodes (rows) and 
destination nodes (columns) is expressed in time units. The main origin and destination nodes 
of this matrix will be all flights in the load factors dataset that depart between the time of the 
earliest flight in the rescheduling matrix and an arbitrary period of 24 hours after the end of 
the airport closure17. Origin flight nodes indicate points in time where passengers are 
expected to make a flight departure. One additional origin node is added for every airport in 
the network labelled “GRT (ground transfer)”, which represents the possibility of departing 
from an airport by road/rail in order to complete the last travel segment. Destination flight 
nodes indicate points in time where passengers have reached the next flight departure in their 
journey. Two additional destination nodes are added for every airport in the network labelled 
“GRT” and “END”. The first denotes a passenger arriving from a flight to immediately leave 
by road/rail in order to complete the last travel segment, and the second denotes a passenger 
that reaches the final destination in its journey. 
                                                 
16 Focusing on passenger delays is consistent with the implicit use of travel times as key performance indicator 
by the European Commission in defining long-term goals in the area of aviation: “By 2050, 90% of travels 
involving air transport within Europe can be completed in 4 hours door-to-door” (EC, 2014a). 
17 This is set up mainly for computational purposes (it restricts the size of the distance matrix) and defines a 
limit in the depth of search for suitable future flights to relocate the passengers. By setting this parameter at 24 
hours after the closure ends, stranded passengers that cannot be relocated on the same day could potentially be 
assigned to the same original itinerary after the airport reopens the following day. 
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The time distances within the matrix are calculated following the set of rules detailed in 
Table 7, which take into account the status of the origin and destination flight nodes. 
Published minimum connecting times are used to generate valid flight connections in this 
stage as well, including official inter-airport transfer times (e.g. Heathrow-Gatwick)18. No 
ground transfer times will be added between surrogate airports in the same city.  
Once the initial distance matrix has been constructed, the rescheduling algorithm finds the 
optimal alternative routing for the disrupted passengers in a dynamic and iterative process 
(Table 8). Capacity constraints are taken into account: if there is no spare capacity to allocate 
all disrupted passengers in their new itinerary, the excess passengers are taken aside and 
relocated in the next iteration using an updated distance matrix that reflects the changes in 
capacity. Any passenger that remains unallocated at the end of the process is flagged as such. 
Table 8. Algorithm for passenger rescheduling 
Inputs:       Time-directed distance matrix (TDM) containing origin and destination flights. 
                    Rescheduling matrix (RES) created from the disrupted records in the baseline scenario. 
                    Matrix of flight schedules and load factors (MFS) from OAG.  
Output:      Matrix with the new itineraries of the relocated passengers (REL). 
1: for each entry of RES do    
2:         lookup the disrupted flights in MFS     
3:         subtract disrupted passengers and check for changes in status (i.e. “FULL” to “ON”)    
4:         if status has changed then update TDM using rules from Table 7    
5:         while not all passengers are processed do    
6:                         SP ← shortest path in TDM between the first flight in RES and the END node of the final destination airport 
7:                         if SP algorithm does not converge then do 
8:                                discard passengers and lookup next entry in RES 
9:                         else 
10:                                create a new entry of REL 
11:                                for each flight segment in SP do    
12:                                      if capacity of the flight is exceeded then do    
13:                                           add the segment to the current entry of REL allocating as many passengers as possible 
14:                                           change the status of the segment in MFS to “FULL” and update TDM 
15:                                           relocate the remaining passengers in further iterations                                   
16:                                      else     
17:                                             add the segment to the current entry of REL allocating the disrupted passengers 
18:                                             if flight is full now then change the status of the segment in MFS to “FULL” and update TDM 
19:                                       end if    
20:                                  end for    
21:                         end if    
22:         end while    
23: end for    
The calculation of shortest-path itineraries made use of the iGraph library in R. This employs 
the well-known Dijkstra algorithm, which performs an exhaustive search19 that ensures that, 
if anything, a shortest path is always returned. 
3.4 Measuring vulnerability and airport criticality 
In total, 100 individual airport closure scenarios are run, four for each of the 25 busiest 
European airports (Table 9). The closures last 24 hours (00:00-24:00 UTC) and happen either 
Monday or Friday, which are considered the most critical days in terms of “weekday” and 
“weekend” traffic. In the Monday case, running both alliance and unrestricted options allows 
us to assess how close the airline alliances that dominate the major European hubs come to 
                                                 
18 Since there are no official inter-airport transfer times for all surrogate airport pairs in the sample, artificial 
values were constructed. We observed that, on average, inter-airport transfers allow for three times the length of 
the uncongested ground transfer plus the standard transfer time for the type of connection. 
19 Despite the relatively high number of nodes (around 64,000 scheduled departures), the shortest-paths problem 
can be easily addressed using iGraph library in R due to the low density of the distance matrix (0.0038). A 
binary-heap implementation of Dijkstra’s algorithm makes the time complexity logarithmic in the number of 
links, i.e. O(L*log(L)+N), where N, L are the total number of nodes and links in the network, respectively. 
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offering the globally optimal solutions (exclusively in terms of travel time) to their disrupted 
passengers. An extra scenario without seat capacity constraints will also be run. 
Table 9. Top 25 busiest European airports (estimated traffic for 1st Week of February 2013) 
Airport Passengers (all markets)  Passengers (intra-EEA)  Distribution of passenger departures % inter- 
 
OD Conn. Total  OD Conn. Total  OneW StarAll Skyteam Other alliance 
London Heathrow (LHR) 903,181 156,133 1,059,314  397,387 24,478 421,865  57.4% 20.2% 6.4% 16.0% 5.6% 
Paris (CDG) 600,521 172,802 773,323  312,842 35,245 348,087  5.7% 11.3% 65.4% 17.5% 6.0% 
Frankfurt (FRA) 422,106 221,392 643,498  211,358 63,908 275,266  6.3% 76.3% 5.5% 11.9% 7.2% 
Istanbul Ataturk (IST) 423,722 189,246 612,968  0 1,208 1,208  1.4% 78.7% 4.4% 15.6% 2.5% 
Madrid (MAD) 475,918 103,879 579,797  368,823 39,602 408,425  51.8% 8.6% 19.1% 20.6% 8.2% 
Amsterdam (AMS) 414,963 157,518 572,481  272,269 45,157 317,426  5.4% 8.7% 70.3% 15.6% 6.4% 
Munich (MUC) 371,358 118,599 489,957  269,747 65,870 335,617  13.1% 73.7% 4.4% 8.8% 3.6% 
Barcelona (BCN) 442,452 14,819 457,271  372,342 12,313 384,655  40.6% 13.7% 11.6% 34.1% 2.4% 
London Gatwick (LGW) 439,171 14,385 453,556  337,820 6,487 344,307  17.7% 2.6% 1.4% 78.3% 3.8% 
Rome Fuimicino (FCO) 363,363 69,602 432,965  261,918 34,293 296,211  7.7% 11.4% 55.6% 25.3% 6.0% 
Paris Orly (ORY) 393,225 20,315 413,540  293,045 15,917 308,962  9.5% 3.2% 47.7% 39.6% 2.3% 
Moscow Dom. (DME) 348,163 40,473 388,636  0 6 6  35.4% 7.2% 2.1% 55.2% 3.9% 
Moscow Sher. (SVO) 276,968 75,973 352,941  0 319 319  0.4% 1.5% 90.9% 7.2% 3.9% 
Oslo (OSL) 293,093 38,861 331,954  264,922 36,591 301,513  4.4% 46.6% 3.2% 45.8% 4.9% 
Copenhagen (CPH) 270,369 48,908 319,277  213,933 39,527 253,460  8.3% 56.7% 4.9% 30.2% 7.1% 
Zurich (ZRH) 246,771 66,517 313,288  165,353 27,967 193,320  12.4% 75.1% 4.9% 7.6% 9.6% 
Stockholm (ARN) 275,928 26,408 302,336  229,491 23,853 253,344  9.1% 56.3% 5.2% 29.3% 5.3% 
Geneva (GVA) 278,612 4,638 283,250  222,724 2,982 225,706  8.8% 30.6% 11.1% 49.6% 3.8% 
Dusseldorf (DUS) 266,593 16,546 283,139  198,081 9,525 207,606  35.7% 44.3% 6.9% 13.0% 3.1% 
Milano Malpensa (MXP) 267,615 4,070 271,685  172,583 1,201 173,784  10.8% 25.3% 12.3% 51.6% 3.3% 
Dublin (DUB) 255,230 9,504 264,734  220,012 5,556 225,568  5.2% 5.2% 4.8% 84.8% 8.4% 
Brussels (BRU) 238,806 23,881 262,687  158,662 10,150 168,812  8.7% 59.1% 8.3% 23.9% 6.9% 
Vienna (VIE) 209,851 52,360 262,211  144,021 20,321 164,342  18.6% 67.5% 5.7% 8.3% 4.7% 
London Stansted (STN) 258,752 623 259,375  249,679 523 250,202  0.9% 2.9% 0.0% 96.2% 1.8% 
Manchester (MAN) 251,335 5,293 256,628  171,173 3,734 174,907  10.0% 14.6% 5.8% 69.6% 5.3% 
Source: MIDT, own elaboration. Note: OD = Origin/destination passengers; Conn.= Connecting passengers. 
Due to the fact that all the disruptions modelled affect only one component of the network 
(the closed airport), the measure of “conditional criticality” under each closure scenario will 
be used also as a measure of “conditional vulnerability” of the entire network20. In our case 
study, this is measured by the non-relocation rate (the proportion of passengers for which an 
alternative itinerary was not found within the search period – 24 hours after the closure ends) 
and, also, by the accumulated delay experienced by the disrupted passengers. For those 
relocated, the total delay is the difference between the journey times of the baseline and 
rescheduled itineraries. For non-relocated passengers, the total delay is measured as the 
difference between their baseline departure and the end of the search period. Separate 
measures of airport criticality will be provided for the intra-EEA markets and we will also 
report the airports that serve the largest amounts of relocated traffic in each closure scenario.  
Finally, the resulting ranking of airport criticality will be compared with three well-known 
topological indicators − degree centrality, closeness, and betweenness centrality − in order to 
establish a link between our results and the previous literature. Degree centrality (Di) is 
calculated as the total number of destinations served by airport i. Closeness (Ci) is the inverse 
of the sum of the distances between airport i and all other airports in the network:  
(1)                                                   𝐶𝑖 =
1
∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑖,𝑗)𝑗
. 
Betweeness centrality (Bi) is calculated as follows: 
(2)                                                    𝐵𝑖 = ∑
𝜎𝑗𝑘(𝑖)
𝜎𝑗𝑘𝑗≠𝑖≠𝑘
 , 
where σjk are the total number of shortest paths (measured in graph distance – number of links 
between two nodes) from airport j to airport k and σjk(i) is the number of those paths that pass 
                                                 
20 From now on, “conditional vulnerability” and “conditional criticality” will be simply referred as vulnerability 
and criticality, respectively. 
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through airport i. Both Ci and Bi will be calculated over unweighted networks and normalized 
between [0,1]. The lack of degrees of freedom prevents us from carrying out a regression 
analysis, so our conclusions will be based on correlation coefficients. Further discussion of 
any drivers of airport criticality beyond network topology will be mostly exploratory and rely 
on ad-hoc indicators based on the simulation results. 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The simulation results are provided in Appendices A-E alongside a glossary of airport codes 
in Appendix F. 
4.1 Airport criticality vs. network topology 
Table 10 summarizes the simulation results for the Monday closure, under alliance recovery, 
and considering all markets (Appendix A). While the limited temporal scope of the measures 
provided (February 4-5, 2013) must always be borne in mind, it is possible to obtain 
interesting conclusions by ranking the airports according to several dimensions. The first one 
is the number of disrupted passengers (dpax), which is topped by major airports; i.e., 
Heathrow, Paris-CDG, and Istanbul (it is estimated to surpass Frankfurt in terms of passenger 
traffic on the sample day). From the point of view of passenger recovery, however, important 
differences can be found within the largest European hubs. The airlines affected by the 
closure of Istanbul Ataturk are able to relocate 61% of disrupted passengers within their own 
alliances (%reloc). The relocation rate increases to around 72% for Heathrow and Paris, 
while Frankfurt stands out with the highest relocation rate in the entire sample at 86.9%. 
Amsterdam is marginally below 60% and other major airports such as Domodedovo (39.5%), 
Milano Malpensa (43.5%), Gatwick (38.9%), or Barcelona (46.2%) are among the worst-
ranked. Of course, relocation rates are capped by the amount of inter-alliance traffic, which 
cannot be relocated as per the model restrictions. However, by comparing these relocation 
rates with the inter-alliance traffic shares reported in Table 9 – all below 10% – , it is clear 
that the performance of the latter airports is very poor. The quality of the alternative 
itineraries is a further concern in Barcelona, as relocated passengers would experience, on 
average, increases of more than 400% in travel times over the best available itineraries from 
the baseline scenario (∆avt%). A similar effect is predicted for Stansted Airport. On the 
contrary, the airlines operating at Frankfurt should be able to provide the best alternative 
itineraries within their own alliances, with an average delay of only 69.5% over the baseline 
travel times. The next best in that category would be Paris-CDG, with a 113.2% ∆avt%. The 
aggregate delay experienced by both relocated and non-relocated passengers (aggdel') 
indicates that the most critical airports in the European network during the sample period 
were Heathrow, Barcelona, and Istanbul with overall impacts ranging from 57 to 64 thousand 
passenger-days. Highest delays per passenger, nevertheless, are experienced in Moscow-
DME, Barcelona, and Milano Malpensa. 
Table 10. Simulation results: Monday closure; alliance passenger recovery; all markets. 
 All markets 
Closed dpax reloc %reloc avt0 avt1 ∆avt% non-reloc aggdel' aggdel'/dpax Di Ci Bi 
Airport (min) (min) (pax-days) (days) 
Heathrow 108,197 78,267 72.30% 348 805 131.50% 29,930 64,832 0.599 140 0.482 0.056 
Barcelona 64,825 29,954 46.20% 174 884 408.80% 34,871 62,718 0.967 107 0.420 0.016 
Istanbul 75,410 46,346 61.50% 300 807 168.50% 29,064 57,843 0.767 174 0.453 0.054 
Gatwick 59,929 23,329 38.90% 162 385 137.80% 36,600 55,821 0.931 107 0.416 0.017 
Madrid 68,386 42,442 62.10% 239 807 237.20% 25,944 52,684 0.770 126 0.448 0.031 
Amsterdam 63,250 37,744 59.70% 319 765 139.80% 25,506 47,370 0.749 170 0.475 0.057 
Moscow DME 46,649 18,428 39.50% 235 502 114.10% 28,221 46,952 1.006 112 0.416 0.055 
Paris CDG 78,532 56,417 71.80% 322 687 113.20% 22,115 44,758 0.570 178 0.488 0.087 
Rome Fuimicino 55,017 36,396 66.20% 231 815 252.90% 18,621 40,864 0.743 110 0.444 0.019 
Paris Orly 55,448 32,541 58.70% 131 425 224.40% 22,907 38,436 0.693 82 0.387 0.019 
Oslo 47,340 29,695 62.70% 133 601 353.30% 17,645 35,183 0.743 70 0.396 0.022 
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Milano Malpensa 36,894 16,050 43.50% 229 551 141.00% 20,844 34,559 0.937 78 0.424 0.008 
Copenhagen 43,467 27,055 62.20% 207 787 279.80% 16,412 33,863 0.779 91 0.424 0.025 
Stockholm Arlanda 41,818 23,159 55.40% 174 742 326.70% 18,659 33,762 0.807 78 0.407 0.028 
Moscow SVO 40,299 23,099 57.30% 353 848 140.40% 17,200 33,463 0.830 112 0.420 0.02 
Stansted 35,871 16,065 44.80% 119 614 416.20% 19,806 32,384 0.903 81 0.362 0.008 
Geneva 34,319 15,416 44.90% 184 771 318.20% 18,903 31,088 0.906 69 0.407 0.004 
Dublin 34,389 15,114 44.00% 158 499 215.00% 19,275 30,748 0.894 75 0.401 0.008 
Munich 63,479 53,656 84.50% 210 625 197.70% 9,823 29,321 0.462 134 0.454 0.024 
Manchester 31,747 16,972 53.50% 199 583 192.50% 14,775 25,980 0.818 86 0.408 0.011 
Frankfurt 69,499 60,412 86.90% 363 616 69.50% 9,087 23,761 0.342 177 0.495 0.081 
Vienna 35,217 29,197 82.90% 210 840 300.60% 6,020 21,766 0.618 94 0.418 0.007 
Dusseldorf 40,820 31,309 76.70% 164 420 156.50% 9,511 19,302 0.473 86 0.419 0.007 
Zurich 34,432 26,912 78.20% 269 662 146.50% 7,520 17,537 0.509 98 0.447 0.014 
Brussels 33,536 25,485 76.00% 197 488 148.00% 8,051 16,457 0.491 93 0.431 0.011 
Notes: dpax: disrupted passengers, reloc: relocated passengers; avt0: average baseline travel time (min) – relocated passengers; avt1: 
average relocated travel time (min); non-reloc: passengers not relocated; aggdel': aggregate delay for all passengers at 23:59 on Tuesday, 
Feb 5th 2013; Di: degree centrality; Ci: closeness; Bi: Betweeness centrality.    
Table 11. Simulation results: Monday closure; alliance passenger recovery; intra-EEA markets. 
Closed Intra-EEA markets 
Airport dpax reloc %reloc avt0  (min) 
avt1  
(min) ∆avt% non-reloc 
aggdel' 
(pax-days) 
aggdel'/dpax  
(days) Di Ci Bi 
Barcelona 58,220 26,749 45.9% 127 876 587.8% 31,471 56,936 0.978 89 0.513 0.055 
Gatwick 50,351 20,759 41.2% 119 357 199.4% 29,592 45,204 0.898 82 0.500 0.045 
Madrid 57,085 35,395 62.0% 146 743 410.0% 21,690 44,559 0.781 84 0.493 0.030 
Heathrow 59,333 43,877 74.0% 143 746 421.0% 15,456 38,441 0.648 62 0.482 0.011 
Amsterdam 45,988 25,950 56.4% 161 685 325.3% 20,038 36,949 0.803 99 0.515 0.039 
Stansted 35,357 15,845 44.8% 115 607 425.4% 19,512 33,543 0.949 80 0.463 0.064 
Rome Fiumicino 42,482 27,818 65.5% 130 773 493.8% 14,664 32,652 0.769 73 0.486 0.025 
Oslo 44,455 28,110 63.2% 105 581 455.3% 16,345 32,159 0.723 63 0.475 0.087 
Stockholm Arlanda 37,390 20,604 55.1% 125 710 467.8% 16,786 31,079 0.831 67 0.465 0.104 
Copenhagen 37,531 23,269 62.0% 139 767 451.8% 14,262 29,858 0.796 72 0.507 0.058 
Dublin 31,656 13,811 43.6% 114 478 317.2% 17,845 28,798 0.910 65 0.479 0.025 
Paris Orly 44,972 28,796 64.0% 119 417 248.8% 16,176 27,931 0.621 63 0.441 0.067 
Geneva 28,670 12,246 42.7% 124 787 534.5% 16,424 27,825 0.971 51 0.488 0.014 
Milano Malpensa 27,932 10,954 39.2% 128 545 325.1% 16,978 27,798 0.995 51 0.470 0.009 
Paris CDG 47,663 35,019 73.5% 162 575 254.0% 12,644 27,017 0.567 89 0.496 0.031 
Munich 48,422 41,132 84.9% 130 588 353.8% 7,290 23,296 0.481 86 0.503 0.028 
Manchester 24,657 14,560 59.1% 131 566 330.9% 10,097 18,885 0.766 65 0.489 0.035 
Vienna 24,659 21,212 86.0% 136 850 524.7% 3,447 15,450 0.627 61 0.468 0.018 
Dusseldorf 33,240 26,091 78.5% 114 386 239.2% 7,149 14,363 0.432 64 0.474 0.014 
Zurich 24,579 18,929 77.0% 147 626 327.2% 5,650 13,921 0.566 59 0.478 0.009 
Frankfurt 39,798 35,556 89.3% 171 434 153.8% 4,242 12,374 0.311 84 0.495 0.023 
Brussels 25,995 21,005 80.8% 139 451 225.0% 4,990 11,388 0.438 63 0.478 0.010 
Moscow Sheremetyevo 38 12 31.6% 474 967 103.9% 26 - - 40 - - 
Istanbul Ataturk 165 155 93.9% 423 452 6.8% 10 - - 53 - - 
Moscow Domodedovo 0 0 - - - - 0 - - 18 - - 
Notes: dpax: disrupted passengers, reloc: relocated passengers; avt0: average baseline travel time (min) – relocated passengers; avt1: 
average relocated travel time (min); non-reloc: passengers not relocated; aggdel': aggregate delay for all passengers at 23:59 on Tuesday, 
Feb 5th 2013; Di: degree centrality; Ci: closeness; Bi: Betweeness centrality.   
Table 11 presents the results for the intra-EEA disrupted passengers. While there are many 
similarities with the overall results (intra-EEA is the largest market in the European airport 
network, see Table 1), the differences highlight the importance of using detailed demand data 
to assess airport criticality. On top of the geographical coverage of airline alliances and other 
restrictions that prevent relocation in particular routes, airports themselves play different roles 
in different markets. While Heathrow, Paris-CDG or Frankfurt devote the majority of their 
traffic to intercontinental routes, airports like Barcelona, Madrid, and Gatwick are mainly 
focused on intra-EEA traffic (Table 9). These three end up being the ones whose closure 
would cause the largest aggregate delays within the EEA internal markets. Among the rest, it 
is worth highlighting the difference between Heathrow and Paris-CDG, which, despite 
similar relocation rates, sharply differ in the quality of the alternative itineraries. Again, 
Frankfurt stands out as the least critical among the top European hubs, though its share of 
intra-EEA traffic is lower than all of the airports mentioned above. 
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The first port of call when searching for the main drivers of airport criticality is network 
topology. As explained in Section 2, the existing literature has established a link between 
network damage and the topological properties of both the network and the individual 
airports. Table 12 shows the linear correlation and rank correlation coefficients between three 
of our demand-based indicators (increase in average travel time: ∆avt%, aggregate delay: 
aggdel', and aggregate delay per passenger) and three supply-based topological measures 
(degree, closeness, and betweenness centrality). When all markets are considered, the 
topological indicators present a positive correlation to aggregate delays yet a negative 
correlation with the average increase in travel time and aggregate delay per passenger. The 
first result is capturing an “airport size” effect and is in line with the previous literature, 
which generally agrees that airports with the highest number of connections and lying in the 
highest proportion of shortest-paths between other airports would also generate the highest 
network damage when closed. In regards to the negative correlations, Hossain et al. (2013) 
notes that the most central an airport is, the easier is to find good surrogates to handle the 
disrupted traffic, thus potentially improving the quality of relocations. However, the 
correlation between centrality and network damage was still expected to be positive. This 
negative effect is not present in the EEA markets, where we find airports that serve as sole 
gateways to domestic/remote destinations (Oslo, Stockholm) and hence, they score high in 
both betweenness centrality and travel time increase as the remote regions become 
disconnected. Overall, the sign and magnitude of these correlations is much different from 
the supply-based measures by Hossain et al. (2013) in the range of 78%-90%. These results 
challenge the traditional views on the relationship between airport centrality and network 
damage from the perspective of passenger recovery, and a more comprehensive search for 
explanatory factors is warranted. 
Table 12. Linear correlation and rank correlation coefficients: criticality vs. topological indicators 
 
All markets 
 
 Intra-EEA markets 
 
Degree Closeness Betweenness  Degree Closeness Betweenness 
∆avt%         
linear correlation -0.541* -0.633* -0.507*   -0.131 0.073 0.259 
rank correlation -0.616* -0.588* -0.479*   -0.069 -0.008 0.246 
aggdel'         
linear correlation 0.414* 0.234 0.399* 
 
 0.429* 0.356 0.393 
rank correlation 0.379 0.165 0.534* 
 
 0.419 0.269 0.529* 
aggdel'/dpax 
    
 
   linear correlation -0.388 -0.567* -0.304 
 
 0.039 0.067 0.276 
rank correlation -0.352 -0.530* -0.233 
 
 -0.066 0.071 0.302 
Notes: * indicates that the coefficient is significant at 95% confidence. 
4.2 Drivers of airport criticality: originating vs. connecting traffic 
Understanding how passenger traffic is redistributed when a large airport closes can help 
identify the drivers of airport criticality. On the one hand, passengers starting or terminating 
their journey in a closed airport (i.e., od traffic) will be able to find an alternative itinerary if a 
local surrogate, that can be reached by ground transport, offers a compatible flight. 
Otherwise, od passengers will be “captive” in the closed airport until it reopens. Connecting 
traffic, on the other hand, is not dependent on local surrogates, but on finding a compatible 
connection elsewhere. Adapting the argument of structural network redundancy discussed in 
Zhang et al. (2015), the quality of the relocation in our case study is expected to reflect how 
the respective alliances overlap in their coverage of the affected markets. 
In order to illustrate the impact of the above factors, Table 13 provides the top ten alternative 
airports for the ten largest closures in terms of disrupted passengers. The top alternative 
airports are the ones that experience the highest increase in passenger departures with respect 
to the baseline scenario. In addition, we also report the proportion of relocated passengers 
that have to wait for the affected airport to reopen. As expected, the top alternative airports in 
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most cases match the dominant alliance of the closure airport (e.g., Heathrow and Madrid are 
both dominated by Oneworld – See Table 9). For Frankfurt and Paris-CDG, in what seems 
the most advantageous situation, the top alternative airports are alliance-matching surrogates 
(Dusseldorf and Orly, respectively), thus improving the chances of finding minimum-delay 
itineraries that can be completed via a road/rail transfer21. This can explain the exceptionally 
high quality of relocation for the Frankfurt closure, as only 55% of disrupted passengers have 
to wait for the airport to reopen22. On the other end, the lack of apparent surrogates among 
the top alternates for Madrid or Barcelona is bound to translate into longer waiting times, 
though the impact is more acute in the latter due to the higher proportion of origin/destination 
(od) traffic over passenger connections (conn).  
Table 13. Top alternative airports: Monday closure; alliance passenger recovery; all markets. 
Closure Heathrow   Paris-CDG   Frankfurt   Istanbul Ataturk   Amsterdam 
 reloc non-reloc  reloc non-reloc  reloc non-reloc  reloc non-reloc  reloc non-reloc 
Total pax 78,267 29,930  56,417 22,115  60,412 9,087  46,346 29,064  37,744 25,506 od pax 64,573 23,488  41,294 18,070  35,756 5,691  31,442 19,631  25,128 20,318 Connecting pax 13,694 6,442   15,123 4,045   24,656 3,396   14,904 9,433   12,616 5,188 
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alt. ∆pax 
 
alt. ∆pax 
 
alt. ∆pax 
MAD 6,097 
 
ORY 9,246 
 
DUS 9,970 
 
FRA 8,123 
 
CDG 8,870 
FRA 5,956 
 
AMS 6,881 
 
MUC 8,462 
 
MUC 6,834 
 
BRU 6,590 
MUC 5,071 
 
FCO 4,941 
 
STR 4,434 
 
ESB 4,280 
 
LHR 1,995 
LGW 4,416 
 
SVO 2,503 
 
CGN 4,009 
 
VIE 3,097 
 
SVO 1,919 
TXL 3,612 
 
FRA 2,484 
 
VIE 3,762 
 
DUS 2,971 
 
ORY 1,733 
BCN 3,595 
 
BRU 2,257 
 
IST 3,156 
 
CAI 2,605 
 
FCO 1,681 
DUS 3,194 
 
LIN 2,166 
 
ZRH 2,468 
 
BRU 2,097 
 
LCY 1,540 
HEL 2,592 
 
LYS 2,146 
 
BRU 2,358 
 
SAW 2,006 
 
MAD 1,375 
BRU 2,582 
 
TLS 1,914 
 
HAM 2,318 
 
ZRH 1,984 
 
FRA 1,249 
VIE 2,523   NCE 1,843   LHR 2,313   HAM 1,963   LIN 1,228 
% After reopening LHR 83.4%   CDG 72.9%   FRA 55.6%   IST 70.4%   AMS 66.3% 
Closure Madrid   Munich   Barcelona   Gatwick   Rome Fuimicino 
 reloc non-reloc  reloc non-reloc  reloc non-reloc  reloc non-reloc  reloc non-reloc 
Total pax 42,442 25,944 
 
53,656 9,823 
 
29,954 34,871 
 
23,329 36,600 
 
36,396 18,621 
od pax 33,086 22,312 
 
37,749 7,352 
 
25,623 32,305 
 
21,846 34,938 
 
26,370 15,837 
Connecting pax 9,356 3,632  15,907 2,471  4,331 2,566  1,483 1,662  10,026 2,784 
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alt. ∆pax 
 
alt. ∆pax 
 
alt. ∆pax 
 
alt. ∆pax 
BCN 8,529 
 
FRA 9,202 
 
MAD 8,819 
 
LHR 4,464 
 
CDG 7,213 
LHR 6,240 
 
STR 6,821 
 
LHR 3,897 
 
STN 2,064 
 
LIN 5,944 
CDG 2,685 
 
DUS 5,633 
 
FRA 1,963 
 
BRS 1,883 
 
AMS 2,756 
PMI 1,971 
 
VIE 4,506 
 
DUS 1,614 
 
LTN 1,609 
 
MXP 2,447 
AMS 1,909 
 
BRU 3,480 
 
MUC 1,595 
 
BHX 1,316 
 
FRA 1,811 
MUC 1,855 
 
TXL 3,272 
 
CDG 1,560 
 
BFS 978 
 
ORY 1,799 
ORY 1,813 
 
HAM 3,196 
 
PMI 1,523 
 
MAD 883 
 
LHR 1,689 
TXL 1,574 
 
NUE 3,129 
 
TXL 1,444 
 
GVA 766 
 
SVO 1,347 
SVQ 1,538 
 
IST 2,464 
 
BRU 1,162 
 
CDG 754 
 
MAD 1,310 
DUS 1,513   CGN 2,392   ORY 1,102   AMS 697   CTA 1,303 
% After reopening MAD 78.9%   MUC 62.6%   BCN 87.2%   LGW 92.3%   FCO 70.0% 
Notes: reloc: relocated passengers; non-reloc: passengers not relocated. 
Table 14 presents the shares of connecting and od traffic, alongside with two new indicators. 
First, we calculate the proportion of overlapping seat capacity (matching alliance and 
destination) offered by the airport’s local surrogates (% overlap surrogates). It ranges from 
77.1% at Dusseldorf –whose passengers could potentially reach alliance-matching Frankfurt 
Airport within the set time limit of 130 minutes–, down to 0% for the relatively isolated 
Madrid and Rome airports. Second, we determine the proportion of connecting traffic for 
which the respective alliance networks offer at least one alternative connection point (% 
overlap alliance). The values are strongly influenced by the distribution of traffic across 
alliance and non-alliance airlines. On one end, we find the 95.6% coverage of Zurich hub 
connections – mainly by Star Alliance –. On the other end, there is an 8.4% coverage for 
                                                 
21 In the CDG case, having Orly as a surrogate reduces relocation times because a final ground transfer from 
Orly to CDG is not added since both airports serve the same city (Table 7). 
22 We ran the Frankfurt closure without the ground transport link to Dusseldorf in order to check the consistency 
of that estimate. The relocation rate would remain virtually the same (86.7%), as well as the proportion of 
passengers after reopening (55.8%). Only the increase in average relocation time would suffer (a 15% increase 
to 84.5%) as Munich, Cologne, and Stuttgart airports absorbed the additional traffic.  
18 
 
Dublin – dominated by Ryanair and Aer Lingus –, an airport with a very low share of 
connections. In order to account for these differences in traffic split, the two types of overlap 
can be combined to estimate the overall proportion of the airport’s traffic that is not covered 
by any other alliance service either locally on in connection (% non-overlap).  
Table 14. Capacity overlap provided by airline alliances and surrogate airports 
Airport %conn overlap  
alliance 
%od overlap  
surrogates 
% non-
overlap 
Potential surrogates  
(airports <130 min uncongested road/rail transfer)  
Heathrow 12.8% 43.0% 87.2% 13.1% 83.1% BHX BOH BRS LCY LGW LTN SEN SOU STN  
Barcelona 3.6% 82.0% 96.4% 1.8% 95.3% GRO ILD REU 
Istanbul 28.0% 51.1% 72.0% 5.4% 81.8% SAW TEQ 
Gatwick 2.7% 39.4% 97.3% 39.2% 60.8% BOH LCY LHR LTN MSF OXF SEN SOU STN 
Madrid 13.8% 51.7% 86.2% 0.0% 92.9% SLM VLL 
Amsterdam 19.9% 59.9% 80.1% 20.2% 71.9% BRU EIN GRQ MST NRN RTM 
Moscow Domodedovo 10.0% 12.1% 90.0% 6.9% 92.6% BKA SVO VKO 
Paris CDG 17.2% 65.5% 82.8% 10.7% 79.9% BVA DOL LEH LIL LTQ ORY XCR 
Rome Fuimicino 15.4% 55.6% 84.6% 0.0% 91.4% CIA 
Paris Orly 3.6% 64.4% 96.4% 20.9% 77.5% BVA CDG DOL LEH TUF XCR 
Oslo 12.4% 46.9% 87.6% 2.9% 91.6% RYG TRF 
Milano Malpensa 1.3% 82.6% 98.7% 20.0% 79.2% BGY GOA LYN LUG PMF TRN VRN 
Copenhagen 15.3% 70.8% 84.7% 5.1% 84.8% AGH HAD KID MMX RKE 
Stockholm Arlanda 9.2% 32.8% 90.8% 1.2% 95.9% BMA NRK NYO VST 
Moscow Sheremetyevo 20.9% 42.7% 79.1% 3.5% 88.3% BKA DME VKO 
Stansted 0.1% 29.4% 99.9% 35.7% 64.3% BHX EMA LCY LGW LHR LTN NWI OXF SEN 
Geneva 1.1% 88.1% 98.9% 26.5% 72.8% BRN DLE LYS NCY 
Dublin 3.1% 8.4% 96.9% 16.5% 83.7% BFS BHD WAT 
Munich 23.0% 85.2% 77.0% 26.9% 59.7% AGB PDH FMM INN NUE STR SZG 
Manchester 2.2% 55.1% 97.8% 44.1% 55.7% BHX BLK DSA EMA GLO HUY LBA LPL VLY 
Frankfurt 31.6% 73.0% 68.4% 38.6% 50.5% CGN DUS FKB HHN NUE SCN STR 
Vienna 21.3% 84.1% 78.7% 2.9% 79.8% BRQ BTS GRZ 
Dusseldorf 6.8% 87.7% 93.2% 77.1% 22.2% BRU CGN CRL DTM EIN FMO FRA MST NRN PAD 
Zurich 18.3% 95.6% 81.7% 29.4% 58.5% ACH BRN BSL FDH FMM MLH STR SXB 
Brussels 7.7% 71.8% 92.3% 66.0% 33.5% AMS CGN CRL DUS EIN LIL LUX MST NRN OST RTM 
Similarly to the previous section, Table 15 presents the linear and rank correlation 
coefficients between our measures of airport criticality, the alliance non-overlap, the share of 
od traffic, and the market shares of alliance and non-alliance airlines. Results confirm the 
intuition that the alliance non-overlap presents a positive correlation to airport criticality, a 
positive and statistically significant relationship also exists between the share of od traffic 
and the aggregate delay per passenger. Among the market shares, the proportion of non-
alliance traffic is the strongest correlate to aggregate delay per passenger. Clearly, non-
alliance airlines will have a harder time in finding alternative itineraries for their disrupted 
passengers exclusively through their own flight networks. On the contrary, there is a negative 
correlation between delays per passenger and the market share of Star Alliance. While it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to establish causal relationships between alliance market 
shares and airport criticality, these correlations are in line with the results from Lordan et al. 
(2015) which point at Star Alliance as the most resilient of the three major alliances.23 
Table 15. Linear correlation and rank correlation: criticality vs. traffic and network overlap indicators 
 
All markets 
 
%non-overlap %od %oneworld %staralliance %skyteam %non-alliance 
∆avt%       
linear correlation 0.368 0.382 -0.043 -0.059 -0.238 0.324 
rank correlation 0.345 0.321 -0.070 -0.047 -0.186 0.302 
aggdel'       
linear correlation 0.575* 0.019 0.457* -0.444* 0.140 0.063 
rank correlation 0.599* -0.003 0.199 -0.374 0.078 0.219 
aggdel'/dpax       
linear correlation 0.580* 0.580* 0.007 -0.616* -0.007 0.668* 
                                                 
23 Indeed, a quick inspection of the MIDT dataset reveals that Star Alliance network offers an average of 1.81 
routings per origin/destination market. This is followed by Skyteam with 1.51 and finally Oneworld with 1.45. 
The intuition is that a higher network redundancy makes passenger recovery easier in case of airport failure. 
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rank correlation 0.469* 0.587* -0.060 -0.590* -0.103 0.696* 
Notes: * indicates that the coefficient is significant at 95% confidence. 
In relation to the topological indicators, it is worth noting that neither degree nor betweenness 
centrality have been defined to capture the existence of local surrogates or the degree of 
alliance coverage. As a result, there is no statistically significant correlation between degree, 
betweenness, or closeness centrality and any of the capacity overlap indicators. This is not to 
say that our variables are the best predictors, but we argue that the positive correlations 
found, within the exploratory nature of this section, are grounds to support further research in 
this area. A graphical representation of how the relationship between these variables could be 
interpreted is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Aggregate delays per passenger vs proportions of non-overlapping and non-alliance traffic 
In general, for the same level of non-overlapping traffic, a higher share of alliance traffic 
tends to reduce delays per passenger. Dual hub operations by major carriers can benefit 
relocation further by providing mutual hub alternatives for connecting markets. The prime 
examples of that are Frankfurt and Munich within Lufthansa’s network (Star Alliance). There 
is also the coupling of Paris-CDG and Amsterdam within the network of Air France-KLM 
(Sky Team), though the chosen factors do not yet provide any explanation for the substantial 
difference in average delays between both airports. Low-cost and other non-alliance 
dominated airports, on the other hand, are among the most critical in terms of delays per 
passenger, regardless of the amount of traffic overlap provided by the local surrogates. In 
particular, it is worth mentioning the case of London Gatwick, which achieves the poorest 
relocation rate in the sample despite its passengers having access to many surrogate airports 
in South East England with low-cost capacity on offer. 
We now explore the impact of the model restrictions in order to determine the limitations of 
the previous factors in explaining airport criticality. One of the most important of these 
restrictions is alliance recovery, implemented via the definition of a multi-layered network 
where relocation across layers is not possible. In order to quantify the negative impact of that 
restriction (as predicted by Cardillo et al., 2013), Table 16 provides a summary of the 
simulation results for the unrestricted recovery scenario. When all markets are considered, 
results show that inter-alliance cooperation can potentially increase relocation rates from 
1.7% (Barcelona) up to 31.2% (Moscow-DME), with an average of 15.5%. This leads to a 
reduction in aggregate delays between 1.2% (Barcelona) up to 45.2% (Frankfurt), with an 
average of 26.8%. Since the increase in relocation rates clearly exceeds the proportion of 
inter-alliance traffic in most cases (Table 9), it is clear that the benefits of alliance 
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cooperation extend to intra-alliance traffic due to cross-alliance network overlap. 
Interestingly, this impact can be different even between alliance-matching airports, such as 
Amsterdam and Paris-CDG. Due to the geography of Sky Team’s network, the passenger 
connections at Amsterdam would benefit more from cross-alliance relocation than those 
connecting in Paris during the sample day24. However, the main effect of removing the 
alliance restriction is that it gives Amsterdam’s od passengers access to the Star Alliance 
frequencies at Brussels, which then becomes main alternate airport under that closure 
scenario (See Appendix B).  
Table 16. Simulation results: Monday closure; unrestricted passenger recovery. 
Closed all markets 
 
 intra-EEA markets 
Airport %reloc diff. aggdel' diff. 
 
 %reloc diff. aggdel' diff. 
Barcelona 47.9% 1.7% 61,965 -1.2% 
 
 46.6% 0.7% 57,078  0.2% 
Madrid 75.3% 13.3% 46,035 -12.6% 
 
 73.4% 11.4% 41,385  -7.1% 
Heathrow 83.6% 11.3% 41,214 -36.4% 
 
 82.1% 8.2% 27,572  -28.3% 
Istanbul 82.8% 21.3% 38,365 -33.7% 
 
 98.8% 4.8% -1  -104.3% 
Gatwick 62.7% 23.8% 37,217 -33.3% 
 
 65.2% 23.9% 29,531  -34.7% 
Fiumicino 83.3% 17.2% 32,696 -20.0% 
 
 82.3% 16.8% 27,868  -14.7% 
Amsterdam 81.0% 21.3% 29,878 -36.9% 
 
 78.5% 22.1% 25,378  -31.3% 
Oslo 74.7% 12.0% 29,019 -16.0% 
 
 75.2% 11.9% 27,238  -17.6% 
Stockholm Arlanda 69.4% 14.0% 28,875 -21.0% 
 
 69.3% 14.2% 26,276  -20.7% 
Paris CDG 85.2% 13.3% 28,731 -35.8% 
 
 84.3% 10.8% 20,707  -23.4% 
Copenhagen 73.5% 11.3% 28,721 -15.2% 
 
 73.4% 11.4% 25,837  -13.5% 
Geneva 67.1% 22.1% 28,299 -15.0% 
 
 68.6% 25.9% 24,169  -14.0% 
Paris Orly 72.6% 13.9% 28,113 -26.9% 
 
 73.8% 9.8% 21,906  -21.6% 
Moscow Domodedovo 70.7% 31.2% 27,919 -40.5% 
 
 - - 0  - 
Dublin 71.9% 28.0% 25,574 -19.2% 
 
 72.4% 28.8% 24,746  -10.3% 
Stansted 62.1% 17.3% 23,690 -29.3% 
 
 62.0% 17.2% 22,969  -27.3% 
Munich 93.3% 8.8% 22,243 -24.1% 
 
 93.4% 8.5% 18,746  -19.5% 
Milano Malpensa 67.2% 23.7% 19,940 -40.8% 
 
 68.0% 28.8% 15,413  -45.2% 
Moscow Sheremetyevo 80.0% 22.7% 19,631 -41.3% 
 
 100.0% 68.4% 0  -100.0% 
Manchester 71.8% 18.4% 18,477 -24.8% 
 
 74.2% 15.2% 15,379  -13.0% 
Vienna 93.9% 11.0% 16,949 -20.5% 
 
 93.0% 7.0% 13,799  -8.5% 
Dusseldorf 79.6% 2.9% 15,291 -16.9% 
 
 80.5% 2.0% 12,203  -16.5% 
Frankfurt 95.4% 8.5% 13,011 -45.2% 
 
 95.9% 6.6% 8,241  -33.4% 
Brussels 83.6% 7.6% 11,832 -24.4% 
 
 85.9% 5.1% 8,559  -23.1% 
Zurich 89.6% 11.4% 10,912 -37.8% 
 
 88.9% 11.9% 9,133  -34.4% 
Notes: diff indicates the difference with respect to the restricted scenarios from Tables 10 and 11.  
Low-cost dominated airports like Gatwick, Stansted, and Dublin particularly benefit from the 
relocation opportunities brought by the alliances’ flight networks, but in the first two cases, 
the unrestricted relocation rates remain below 70%. The case of Barcelona is also 
noteworthy, since its performance barely changes with respect to the alliance recovery 
scenario. What keeps passengers from being relocated is seat capacity. If we run the original 
model with unlimited seat capacity (Appendix C), relocation rates rise above 90% in 22 out 
of the 25 closures, with individual improvements that range from 10% to 45%. Therefore, the 
final methodological implication of this section is that ignoring seat capacity in the analysis 
of network vulnerability and airport criticality, as it is common in previous studies, will 
introduce a major distortion in the results.  
Finally, the robustness of these results is discussed by changing the temporal scope of the 
simulations. All the rankings of airport criticality presented above refer to Monday closures. 
The results from the Friday simulation (shown in Appendix D) lead to slightly different 
rankings, but are fully consistent with all the conclusions in this section. More relevant is the 
expected variability in traffic across the year. Airports that experience strong seasonality will 
become more critical to the European network in the summer period. In order to illustrate 
                                                 
24 The MIDT reveals that 26.2% of Sky Team’s connecting passengers at Amsterdam could only be relocated in 
other alliances, while the same indicator for Paris is 21%. 
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that, Appendix E shows the results for a new simulation25 carried out using data from August 
2013. We find that relocation rates are generally much lower in August than in February, 
which we attribute to the same factors discussed in the paper: increased od traffic in summer, 
increased non-alliance traffic (from 43.2% in February to 48.5% in August), and reduction in 
spare capacity (load factor in intra-European flights increases from 67.2% in February to 
74.6% in August). A particularly interesting case is Palma de Mallorca (PMI) airport, which 
stands out as one of the most critical airports in August, despite not appearing in the February 
ranking. PMI airport shows the lowest relocation rate in the sample (29.9%), which, besides 
of the above factors, can be attributed to the lack of road/rail surrogates for an island airport 
which may impose additional constraints to passenger relocation in the event of a closure. 
4.3 Policy and management implications 
From a policy perspective, the proposed method provides useful reference values for the 
development of strategies aimed at improving the resilience of the European transport 
network. The identification of critical airports for particular origin and destination markets 
can help directing investment to achieve high-level strategic objectives. One of these 
objectives is to ensure robust gate-to-gate travel times within the EEA. From the point of 
view of air transport, the intra-EEA is mainly a point-to-point market (approx. 10% 
connecting traffic). Thus, resilience rests mainly on the ability of airlines to find local 
surrogate airports −the issues of accessibility and intermodality take center stage here−, as 
well as the available capacity of the affected airports to absorb the increased traffic after 
reopening. Unsurprisingly, the most critical airports in intra-EEA markets are: a) 
geographically isolated (e.g., Madrid), which prevents them to have local surrogates that can 
be reached by ground transport; b) located in airport systems in which the local surrogate has 
a low level of network overlapping with the closed airport or there is a high proportion of 
low-cost traffic (e.g., Barcelona); or c) part of an airport system in which the main surrogate 
is severely congested (e.g., London Gatwick). 
Another high-level objective could be to reinforce the air transport links with emerging 
economies. With enough data, the proposed method can help determine how important 
foreign airports and airlines are to the worldwide connectivity of the EEA. In relation to that, 
the fact that Istanbul Ataturk is one of the most critical airports for the transportation of air 
passengers in the European continent, as well as the key player in facilitating air transport 
between EEA and non-EEA European countries is indeed relevant. 
From an airport management and tactical perspective, quantifying the impact on passengers 
during airport closures can be used to justify pre-emptive investments in facilities, equipment, 
personnel, and intermodal connectivity, as well as emergency planning and the enactment of 
additional policies to guarantee the resilience of the network. One may argue that these 
results should be combined with models of climate risk in order to identify the places where 
there is a coincidence of bad weather conditions and high airport criticality. London airports 
could be used as example. After the extended closure of London Heathrow airport due to 
snow in December 2010, a resilience enquiry determined that additional investments in “an 
enhanced snow plan” were needed (Heathrow Airport, 2010). As a result, the airport operator 
invested £36 million in related staff and equipment (BBC, 2013) and have been investing 
more in resilience ever since.  
Climate risk notwithstanding, airport criticality is affected by other factors. For example, the 
extreme criticality of Barcelona airport in this case study is a close reminder of the effects of 
the so-called “wildcat strike” by ground handling workers in late July 2006 (19 months 
                                                 
25 Full details on the August simulation are available from the authors upon request. 
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before the high-speed rail line with Madrid was inaugurated). The industrial action 
culminated with a runway incursion that paralyzed airport operations for 11 hours, affecting 
approximately 100,000 passengers (El País, 2006). The airport took four days to recover 
while the disrupted passengers camped across the entire terminal concourse in the absence of 
alternative means of transportation. Iberia, the dominant airline at the time, brought 100 staff 
members from other airports and provided additional seat capacity in critical routes. A similar 
situation occurred in late 2010, amidst a nationwide strike of Air Traffic Controllers (ATC), 
the national railway operator increased capacity in 4,800 seats on the high-speed train 
between Barcelona and Madrid (this would represent approximately 3.6% of the disrupted 
passengers in our case study). Normality was recovered after five days (El País, 2010). By 
combining these past experiences with our estimates of airport criticality, and the prospects of 
an ongoing conflict with the ATC unions in Spain, a clear policy recommendation is the 
enactment of regulatory measures to ensure the continuous provision of ATC at least in the 
country’s main airports.  
From the perspective of airline operations and network development, results provide 
estimates of how demand would be geographically redistributed under a minimum-delay 
criterion, as well as the points in which adding capacity would help speeding up the return to 
normal after the shock. They also highlight the importance of inter-alliance cooperation, 
which could become a required procedure in emergency situations. In addition, the model 
provides a framework to quantify the benefits for airlines (and their main hubs) to either join 
an alliance or support the integration of other carriers. To illustrate this point, we ran the 
Monday simulation for the Heathrow closure adding Qatar Airways’ seat capacity to the 
Oneworld network26 (the Middle Eastern airline joined the alliance in October 2013). The 
relocation rate at Heathrow would increase 2.3% and Doha airport would experience the 
highest increase in relocated traffic from Heathrow in non-EEA markets (11.7% of the 
disrupted non-EEA passengers). This indicates that Qatar Airways is able to provide 
minimum-delay alternative itineraries in those routes against other options for passenger 
recovery within the alliance network. This type of evidence could also be valuable within the 
current debate about the increasingly dominant role of Middle Eastern airlines and airports in 
worldwide international markets and their relationships with other network carriers both in 
Europe and the US.  
5. SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This paper undertakes an exploratory analysis of the vulnerability of the European air 
transport network to major airport closures from the perspective of the delays imposed to 
disrupted airline passengers. Using an MIDT dataset on passenger itineraries flown during 
February 2013, full-day individual closures of the 25 busiest European airports are simulated 
and disrupted passengers then relocated to minimum-delay itineraries within the respective 
alliances’ networks where seat capacity is available.  
From a methodological perspective, our results illustrate the added value of employing 
demand data and modelling passenger recovery for a true system-based assessment of the 
vulnerability of air transport networks. The traditional topological indicators of degree and 
betweenness centrality, used by previous air transport studies, are not able to capture 
important drivers of structural network redundancy that the broad literature on transport 
networks identifies as relevant as well. In our case study, these factors include both the 
capacity provided by local surrogate airports and the specific network overlap from the 
respective airline alliances, which are shown to have an impact on passenger relocation 
delays. As a consequence, the proportion of non-alliance traffic is a strong predictor of 
                                                 
26 Full simulation results under that scenario are available from the authors upon request. 
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aggregate delay per passenger. Airports dominated by non-alliance airlines (e.g. low-cost 
carriers) will be less successful in finding alternative itineraries for their disrupted passengers 
exclusively through their own flight networks. When alliance restrictions are removed, the 
benefits in terms of passenger recovery extend to intra-alliance traffic due to cross-alliance 
network overlap. Finally, it is worth noting the importance of accounting for seat capacity 
restrictions, which can prevent early recovery of up to 45% of disrupted passengers. 
An additional contribution is the ability to disaggregate the impact according to geographical 
market. Our rankings point at Heathrow airport as the most critical in the European air 
transport network in terms of aggregated delays, while Barcelona would take that spot for the 
intra-EEA markets. The latter airport is affected by the lack of compatible surrogates and 
significant capacity constraints to handle the amount of disrupted traffic generated by a 24-
hour closure. Within the largest European hubs, Frankfurt stands out as the most resilient 
overall due to its relatively low share of non-alliance traffic, the good network coverage of 
connecting routes (supported by Lufthansa’s dual-hub strategy), and the availability of 
alliance-matching surrogate airports.  
From a policy and managerial perspective, the proposed method provides useful reference 
values for the development of strategies aimed at improving the resilience of the European 
transport network. The identification of critical airports for particular origin and destination 
markets can help directing investment to suit high-level strategic objectives, such as ensuring 
robust gate-to-gate travel times within the European Union, or reinforcing the air transport 
links with emerging economies. The quantification of the short-term passenger delays 
resulting from airport closures (especially those in geographical isolation), can be used to 
support additional investments in equipment, personnel, and intermodal connectivity to 
mitigate the impact on the system. From the perspective of airline operations and network 
development, results highlight the importance of inter-alliance cooperation and provide a 
framework to quantify the benefits for airlines (and their main hubs) to either join an alliance 
or support the integration of other carriers.  
Our results, however, are conditioned to the limited post-reopening search period (24 hours) 
and the 130 min uncongested road/rail transfer. The first constraint is imposed by the 
available computational capacity. Expanding the search period will increase the relocation 
rate but at the same time also increase the aggregate delays. Taking into account that i) most 
closure scenarios see the majority of their passengers relocated within the set time, and ii) 
poorly performing airports face important capacity constraints, no significant variation of the 
airport rankings is expected. Increasing the time limit for surrogate airports will require 
modifying the model to allow for ground transport modes (such as high-speed rail) to 
substitute air travel in short-haul trips, thus expanding the scope of this research to analyse 
the resilience of the integrated European transport network. This could lead to interesting 
estimates, e.g. what is the contribution of Eurostar trains or the Madrid/Barcelona high-speed 
rail line to passenger recovery when any of the relevant airports fails?  
Expanding the temporal scope of analysis to capture additional sources of airport criticality is 
a straightforward extension of our paper, but the proposed model has many other 
applications. In its current form, it can also be used to simulate extended airport closures of 
single airports, city-wide multi-airport systems, or even nationwide networks. One aspect that 
the current approach ignores (simply because of computational limitations) is the possibility 
of a high correlation between multiple airport closures in the same geographical region due 
to, for example, weather conditions. In that context, it is not realistic to assume that ground 
transfer links between airports in the same affected area will remain a valid alternative to 
stranded passengers, thus also creating more delays and relocation costs. With enough depth 
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of computation, determining the number of days it takes the system to fully absorb the shock 
is an alternative way to approach the analysis of network vulnerability and airport criticality. 
Additional applications include airline failures at their main bases or even entire shutdowns 
due to e.g. industrial actions. Another objective is to model airspace closures linked to 
weather conditions or armed conflicts. The geographical scope of analysis can also be 
expanded to include the worldwide airport network, with particular attention to the Middle 
East hubs and their increasingly dominant role in connecting markets. 
We conclude by proposing three main avenues for further research in order to overcome the 
many limitations of our current methodology:  
i) Introduce a set of criteria to prioritize different options of passenger recovery across layers 
(e.g. airline, alliance, interline partners, other airlines) in order to model the passenger 
rescheduling process in a more realistic fashion. This can be achieved by incorporating the 
published IROPS (Irregular Operations) guidelines for the major carriers into the 
rescheduling algorithm. 
ii) Introducing aircraft and crew recovery decisions by the affected airlines. Due to the 
European-wide scale of our case study, a sequential approach would reduce the complexity of 
the model. Given a particular airport closure, airlines would first relocate their crews and 
aircraft following an objective of cost minimization (Barnhart, 2009). The updated flight 
schedules could then be used in the passenger recovery stage as described in this paper. This 
model would have to consider aspects that our simplified simulation ignores, such as the 
constraints imposed by crew work rules, maintenance schedules, airport capacity and airside 
congestion, the impact of flight diversions, and the propagation of delays across the flight 
network to other airports. In addition, the use of airline costs as objective function in this 
optimization process will lead to useful estimates for airline managers and policymakers.  
iii) Combining flight and rail schedules in the distance matrix and introducing a passenger 
choice model. Potentiating intermodal connections between air and rail transport modes in 
order to reduce gate-to-gate travel times and improve the resilience of the European 
transportation network is one of the high-level objectives of the European Commission for 
2050 (EC, 2014a). In that regard, the introduction of rail schedules would allow for a more 
realistic picture of the travel options available to each disrupted passenger. The potential of 
these new travel alternatives will only be fully exploited with an econometric model of 
passenger choice. This would require the collecting information on variables such as: air and 
rail fares, competition, access and travel times, and booking classes. A Multinomial Logit 
model of travel itinerary selection has been employed by many authors in this context and 
could be applied to that end (See Grosche, 2009).  
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Appendix A. Simulation results: Airport closure on Monday, February 4th 2013 between from 00:00 to 23:59 UTC; passenger recovery via alliance network. 
Closed All markets 
 
intra-EEA markets 
Airport dpax conn %conn reloc %reloc avt0 avt1 ∆avt% aggdel aggdel' alt. ∆pax %reloc 
 
dpax conn %conn reloc %reloc avt0 avt1 ∆% aggdel aggdel' alt. ∆pax %reloc 
LHR 108,197 13,896 12.8% 78,267 72.3%    348     805  131.5% 24,850 64,832 FRA 6,160 7.9% 
 
59,333 3,604 6.1% 43,877 74.0% 143 746 421.0% 18,360 38,441 FRA 4,594 10.5% 
CDG 78,532 13,472 17.2% 56,417 71.8%    322     687  113.2% 14,299 44,758 ORY 9,246 16.4% 
 
47,663 4,701 9.9% 35,019 73.5% 162 575 254.0% 10,032 27,017 ORY 6,791 19.4% 
FRA 69,499 21,971 31.6% 60,412 86.9%    363     616  69.5% 10,600 23,761 DUS 9,970 16.5% 
 
39,798 8,970 22.5% 35,556 89.3% 171 434 153.8% 6,488 12,374 DUS 7,155 20.1% 
IST 75,410 21,130 28.0% 46,346 61.5%    300     807  168.5% 16,292 57,843 FRA 8,123 17.5% 
 
165 165 100.0% 155 93.9% 423 452 6.8% 3 21 MUC 74 47.7% 
AMS 63,250 12,595 19.9% 37,744 59.7%    319     765  139.8% 11,695 47,370 CDG 8,870 23.5% 
 
45,988 5,408 11.8% 25,950 56.4% 161 685 325.3% 9,439 36,949 CDG 5,837 22.5% 
MAD 68,386 9,419 13.8% 42,442 62.1%    239     807  237.2% 16,740 52,684 BCN 8,529 20.1% 
 
57,085 5,148 9.0% 35,395 62.0% 146 743 410.0% 14,680 44,559 BCN 7,654 21.6% 
MUC 63,479 14,606 23.0% 53,656 84.5%    210     625  197.7% 15,453 29,321 FRA 9,202 17.1% 
 
48,422 8,721 18.0% 41,132 84.9% 130 588 353.8% 13,096 23,296 FRA 6,711 16.3% 
FCO 55,017 8,474 15.4% 36,396 66.2%    231     815  252.9% 14,768 40,864 CDG 7,213 19.8% 
 
42,482 4,692 11.0% 27,818 65.5% 130 773 493.8% 12,419 32,652 LIN 5,243 18.8% 
LGW 59,929 1,611 2.7% 23,329 38.9%    162     385  137.8% 3,615 55,821 LHR 4,464 19.1% 
 
50,351 963 1.9% 20,759 41.2% 119 357 199.4% 3,424 45,204 LHR 3,641 17.5% 
BCN 64,825 2,360 3.6% 29,954 46.2%    174     884  408.8% 14,770 62,718 MAD 8,819 29.4% 
 
58,220 1,957 3.4% 26,749 45.9% 127 876 587.8% 13,903 56,936 MAD 8,371 31.3% 
DME 46,649 4,658 10.0% 18,428 39.5%    235     502  114.1% 3,426 46,952 SVO 1,051 5.7% 
 
0 0 - 0 - - - - 0 0 - 0 0.0% 
SVO 40,299 8,422 20.9% 23,099 57.3%    353     848  140.4% 7,948 33,463 CDG 5,410 23.4% 
 
38 38 100.0% 12 31.6% 474 967 103.9% 4 49 AMS 9 75.0% 
ORY 55,448 2,013 3.6% 32,541 58.7%    131     425  224.4% 6,645 38,436 CDG 9,990 30.7% 
 
44,972 1,770 3.9% 28,796 64.0% 119 417 248.8% 5,944 27,931 CDG 9,398 32.6% 
CPH 43,467 6,672 15.3% 27,055 62.2%    207     787  279.8% 10,889 33,863 FRA 5,017 18.5% 
 
37,531 5,477 14.6% 23,269 62.0% 139 767 451.8% 10,146 29,858 FRA 4,582 19.7% 
ZRH 34,432 6,287 18.3% 26,912 78.2%    269     662  146.5% 7,354 17,537 STR 5,524 20.5% 
 
24,579 3,181 12.9% 18,929 77.0% 147 626 327.2% 6,305 13,921 STR 4,445 23.5% 
GVA 34,319 393 1.1% 15,416 44.9%    184     771  318.2% 6,278 33,735 LYS 4,419 28.7% 
 
28,670 256 0.9% 12,246 42.7% 124 787 534.5% 5,636 28,544 LYS 3,156 25.8% 
MXP 36,894 463 1.3% 16,050 43.5%    229     551  141.0% 3,596 34,382 LIN 2,675 16.7% 
 
27,932 209 0.7% 10,954 39.2% 128 545 325.1% 3,170 25,922 LIN 1,626 14.8% 
STN 35,871 47 0.1% 16,065 44.8%    119     614  416.2% 5,527 33,786 BRS 1,600 10.0% 
 
35,357 43 0.1% 15,845 44.8% 115 607 425.4% 5,406 31,808 BRS 1,600 10.1% 
DUB 34,389 1,051 3.1% 15,114 44.0%    158     499  215.0% 3,573 29,707 LHR 1,607 10.6% 
 
31,656 789 2.5% 13,811 43.6% 114 478 317.2% 3,483 29,258 LHR 1,526 11.0% 
DUS 40,820 2,759 6.8% 31,309 76.7%    164     420  156.5% 5,576 19,146 FRA 7,907 25.3% 
 
33,240 2,001 6.0% 26,091 78.5% 114 386 239.2% 4,931 14,771 FRA 6,555 25.1% 
MAN 31,747 701 2.2% 16,972 53.5%    199     583  192.5% 4,525 25,325 BHX 3,379 19.9% 
 
24,657 481 2.0% 14,560 59.1% 131 566 330.9% 4,393 18,435 BHX 2,895 19.9% 
BRU 33,536 2,573 7.7% 25,485 76.0%    197     488  148.0% 5,149 16,667 DUS 5,805 22.8% 
 
25,995 1,800 6.9% 21,005 80.8% 139 451 225.0% 4,557 11,403 DUS 5,013 23.9% 
VIE 35,217 7,509 21.3% 29,197 82.9%    210     840  300.6% 12,775 20,945 FRA 7,115 24.4% 
 
24,659 3,232 13.1% 21,212 86.0% 136 850 524.7% 10,518 15,466 MUC 5,600 26.4% 
ARN 41,818 3,867 9.2% 23,159 55.4%    174     742  326.7% 9,138 35,597 FRA 4,461 19.3% 
 
37,390 3,484 9.3% 20,604 55.1% 125 710 467.8% 8,365 32,334 CPH 3,834 18.6% 
OSL 47,340 5,854 12.4% 29,695 62.7%    133     601  353.3% 9,663 34,909 CPH 3,460 11.7% 
 
44,455 5,603 12.6% 28,110 63.2% 105 581 455.3% 9,295 31,421 BGO 3,212 11.4% 
 
Appendix B. Simulation results: Airport closure on Monday, February 4th 2013 between from 00:00 to 23:59 UTC; unrestricted passenger recovery. 
Closed All markets 
 
intra-EEA markets 
Airport dpax conn %conn reloc %reloc avt0 avt1 ∆avt% aggdel aggdel' alt. ∆pax %reloc 
 
dpax conn %conn reloc %reloc avt0 avt1 ∆% aggdel aggdel' alt. ∆pax %reloc 
LHR 108,197 13,896 12.8% 90,504 83.6% 368 676 83.9% 19,390 41,214 LGW 10,124 11.2% 
 
59,333 3,604 6.1% 48,724 82.1% 149 571 284.2% 14,290 27,572 LGW 7,319 15.0% 
CDG 78,532 13,472 17.2% 66,891 85.2% 330 631 90.9% 13,952 28,731 ORY 15,966 23.9% 
 
47,663 4,701 9.9% 40,188 84.3% 161 568 251.8% 11,339 20,707 ORY 10,900 27.1% 
FRA 69,499 21,971 31.6% 66,306 95.4% 369 563 52.6% 8,937 13,011 DUS 10,208 15.4% 
 
39,798 8,970 22.5% 38,186 95.9% 176 412 133.6% 6,244 8,241 DUS 7,072 18.5% 
IST 75,410 21,130 28.0% 62,428 82.8% 306 794 159.1% 21,125 38,365 SAW 9,634 15.4% 
 
165 165 100.0% 163 98.8% 428 384 -10.2% -5 -1 MUC 54 33.1% 
AMS 63,250 12,595 19.9% 51,214 81.0% 307 711 131.4% 14,357 29,878 BRU 13,953 27.2% 
 
45,988 5,408 11.8% 36,111 78.5% 161 673 317.8% 12,831 25,378 BRU 11,536 31.9% 
MAD 68,386 9,419 13.8% 51,507 75.3% 247 930 277.2% 24,458 46,035 BCN 9,669 18.8% 
 
57,085 5,148 9.0% 41,925 73.4% 152 912 501.5% 22,142 41,385 BCN 8,734 20.8% 
MUC 63,479 14,606 23.0% 59,241 93.3% 217 633 191.4% 17,105 22,243 STR 7,135 12.0% 
 
48,422 8,721 18.0% 45,230 93.4% 136 610 349.4% 14,895 18,746 STR 5,672 12.5% 
FCO 55,017 8,474 15.4% 45,856 83.3% 227 891 293.2% 21,167 32,696 LIN 5,995 13.1% 
 
42,482 4,692 11.0% 34,967 82.3% 132 894 579.5% 18,504 27,868 LIN 5,368 15.4% 
LGW 59,929 1,611 2.7% 37,580 62.7% 174 382 119.2% 5,421 37,217 LHR 15,044 40.0% 
 
50,351 963 1.9% 32,818 65.2% 134 352 162.4% 4,959 29,531 LHR 12,996 39.6% 
BCN 64,825 2,360 3.6% 31,064 47.9% 180 972 438.7% 17,070 61,965 MAD 9,077 29.2% 
 
58,220 1,957 3.4% 27,143 46.6% 134 976 628.7% 15,865 57,078 MAD 8,072 29.7% 
DME 46,649 4,658 10.0% 32,967 70.7% 267 642 140.1% 8,574 27,919 SVO 10,660 32.3% 
 
0 0 - 0 - - - - - 0 - 0 0.0% 
SVO 40,299 8,422 20.9% 32,242 80.0% 357 741 107.4% 8,594 19,631 DME 9,576 29.7% 
 
38 38 100.0% 38 100.0% 457 473 3.5% 0 0 BCN 6 15.8% 
ORY 55,448 2,013 3.6% 40,230 72.6% 139 415 199.2% 7,715 28,113 CDG 17,511 43.5% 
 
44,972 1,770 3.9% 33,185 73.8% 124 401 222.4% 6,376 21,906 CDG 14,040 42.3% 
CPH 43,467 6,672 15.3% 31,965 73.5% 214 842 293.8% 13,951 28,721 FRA 5,209 16.3% 
 
37,531 5,477 14.6% 27,566 73.4% 147 840 471.2% 13,258 25,837 FRA 4,919 17.8% 
ZRH 34,432 6,287 18.3% 30,849 89.6% 274 575 110.2% 6,457 10,912 STR 5,386 17.5% 
 
24,579 3,181 12.9% 21,850 88.9% 151 527 249.9% 5,714 9,133 STR 4,311 19.7% 
GVA 34,319 393 1.1% 23,014 67.1% 158 963 508.2% 12,854 26,526 LYS 8,241 35.8% 
 
28,670 256 0.9% 19,663 68.6% 117 972 731.9% 11,680 23,364 LYS 6,753 34.3% 
MXP 36,894 463 1.3% 24,805 67.2% 192 478 148.4% 4,916 20,715 LIN 8,002 32.3% 
 
27,932 209 0.7% 19,004 68.0% 119 442 271.6% 4,261 15,048 LIN 6,609 34.8% 
STN 35,871 47 0.1% 22,281 62.1% 121 454 274.4% 5,154 22,064 LHR 8,026 36.0% 
 
35,357 43 0.1% 21,935 62.0% 118 453 284.8% 5,111 23,832 LHR 7,849 35.8% 
DUB 34,389 1,051 3.1% 24,735 71.9% 167 947 467.1% 13,392 26,370 LHR 5,720 23.1% 
 
31,656 789 2.5% 22,918 72.4% 127 965 660.0% 13,344 24,873 LHR 5,852 25.5% 
DUS 40,820 2,746 6.7% 32,504 79.6% 174 364 109.2% 4,293 14,815 FRA 7,973 24.5% 
 
33,345 2,001 6.0% 26,845 80.5% 124 328 164.0% 3,803 12,332 FRA 6,335 23.6% 
MAN 31,747 701 2.2% 22,803 71.8% 224 712 218.5% 7,735 18,978 BHX 5,292 23.2% 
 
24,657 481 2.0% 18,299 74.2% 148 695 368.4% 6,942 14,600 BHX 4,348 23.8% 
BRU 33,536 2,573 7.7% 28,044 83.6% 212 454 114.7% 4,723 11,832 DUS 5,516 19.7% 
 
25,995 1,800 6.9% 22,338 85.9% 144 405 181.2% 4,053 8,559 DUS 4,387 19.6% 
VIE 35,217 7,509 21.3% 33,060 93.9% 220 838 281.7% 14,200 16,949 FRA 7,121 21.5% 
 
24,659 3,232 13.1% 22,926 93.0% 139 868 526.1% 11,607 13,799 FRA 5,736 25.0% 
ARN 41,818 3,867 9.2% 29,010 69.4% 175 780 344.6% 12,182 28,875 CPH 4,319 14.9% 
 
37,390 3,484 9.3% 25,924 69.3% 130 769 491.6% 11,497 26,276 CPH 3,940 15.2% 
OSL 47,340 5,854 12.4% 35,386 74.7% 143 707 393.6% 13,852 29,019 CPH 5,143 14.5% 
 
44,455 5,603 12.6% 33,421 75.2% 118 694 490.2% 13,379 27,238 BGO 4,904 14.7% 
Notes: dpax: disrupted passengers, conn: connecting passengers; reloc: relocated passengers; avt0: average original travel time (min) – relocated passengers; avt1: average relocated travel time (min); aggdel: aggregate delay in pax-days 
-relocated passengers; aggdel': aggregate delay in pax-days for all passengers at 23:59 on Tuesday, Feb 5th 2013; alt: main alternate airport; ∆pax: number of relocated passenger departures at the alternate airport.   
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Appendix C. Simulation results: Airport closure on Monday, February 4th 2013 between from 00:00 to 23:59 UTC; passenger recovery via alliance network; unlimited capacity. 
Closed All markets 
 
intra-EEA markets 
Airport dpax conn %conn reloc %reloc avt0 avt1 ∆avt% aggdel aggdel' alt. ∆pax %reloc 
 
dpax conn %conn reloc %reloc avt0 avt1 ∆% aggdel aggdel' alt. ∆pax %reloc 
LHR 108,197 13,896 12.8% 104,390 96.5% 344 566 64.4% 16,073 20,997 LGW 10,013 9.6%  59,333 3,604 6.1% 58,693 98.9% 143 346 143% 8,302 9,138 LGW 7,815 13.3% 
CDG 78,532 13,472 17.2% 73,342 93.4% 308 551 78.9% 12,373 19,764 ORY 17,302 23.6%  47,663 4,701 9.9% 46,285 97.1% 153 379 148% 7,270 9,092 ORY 13,844 29.9% 
IST 75,410 21,130 28.0% 70,555 93.6% 287 533 85.6% 12,036 18,798 FRA 18,048 25.6%  165 165 100.0% 155 93.9% 423 407 -4% 0 16 MUC 59 38.1% 
FRA 69,499 21,971 31.6% 65,357 94.0% 361 575 59.4% 9,735 15,728 DUS 11,331 17.3%  39,798 8,970 22.5% 38,638 97.1% 171 369 116% 5,318 6,944 DUS 8,154 21.1% 
MAD 68,386 9,419 13.8% 64,186 93.9% 225 622 176.0% 17,670 23,580 BCN 8,923 13.9%  57,085 5,148 9.0% 54,454 95.4% 144 542 275% 15,032 18,651 BCN 7,382 13.6% 
BCN 64,825 2,360 3.6% 59,562 91.9% 161 567 251.3% 16,769 24,259 MAD 11,203 18.8%  58,220 1,957 3.4% 54,043 92.8% 123 540 341% 15,683 21,368 MAD 10,395 19.2% 
MUC 63,479 14,606 23.0% 60,486 95.3% 213 456 114.1% 10,199 14,064 FRA 9361 15.5%  48,422 8,721 18.0% 46,504 96.0% 130 381 193% 2 2,466 STR 8019 17.2% 
AMS 63,250 12,595 19.9% 59,361 93.9% 269 562 108.7% 12,068 17,754 BRU 12,081 20.4%  45,988 5,408 11.8% 44,430 96.6% 145 454 213% 9,521 11,693 BRU 10,129 22.8% 
LGW 59,929 1,611 2.7% 49,401 82.4% 160 333 108.4% 5,933 21,396 LHR 5,124 10.4%  50,351 963 1.9% 44,315 88.0% 124 300 143% 5,438 13,978 LTN 4,891 11.0% 
ORY 55,448 2,013 3.6% 51,275 92.5% 145 319 119.3% 6,170 12,212 CDG 13,819 27.0%  44,972 1,770 3.9% 44,238 98.4% 129 292 125% 4,987 5,983 CDG 13,143 29.7% 
FCO 55,017 8,474 15.4% 51,040 92.8% 214 606 182.8% 13,889 19,515 CDG 10,763 21.1%  42,482 4,692 11.0% 40,442 95.2% 125 540 331% 11,641 14,392 CDG 7,481 18.5% 
OSL 47,340 5,854 12.4% 42,906 90.6% 136 463 239.7% 9,730 15,964 SVG 6,962 16.2%  44,455 5,603 12.6% 40,640 91.4% 108 440 307% 9,359 14,793 SVG 6,685 16.4% 
DME 46,649 4,658 10.0% 35,804 76.8% 237 374 57.9% 3,411 19,895 LHR 1914 5.3%  0 0 - 0 - 0 0 - 0 0 - 0 0 
CPH 43,467 6,672 15.3% 40,545 93.3% 195 463 137.8% 7,555 11,582 ARN 7,675 18.9%  37,531 5,477 14.6% 35,379 94.3% 130 411 216% 6,911 9,774 ARN 6,834 19.3% 
ARN 41,818 3,867 9.2% 39,287 93.9% 166 397 138.8% 6,302 9,646 CPH 6,849 17.4%  37,390 3,484 9.3% 35,399 94.7% 119 347 191% 5,597 8,536 CPH 6,065 17.1% 
DUS 40,820 2,746 6.7% 38,401 94.1% 169 355 110.2% 4,968 8,271 FRA 8,127 21.2%  33,345 2,001 6.0% 31,926 95.7% 114 306 169% 4,264 6,220 FRA 6,580 20.6% 
SVO 40,299 8,422 20.9% 37,883 94.0% 336 588 75.0% 6,635 10,220 AMS 6,528 17.2%  38 38 100.0% 29 76.3% 461 903 96% 9 25 CDG 12 41.4% 
MXP 36,894 463 1.3% 34,129 92.5% 185 412 122.7% 5,377 9,248 LIN 4,596 13.5%  27,932 209 0.7% 26,730 95.7% 117 367 214% 4,640 6,312 LGW 4,107 15.4% 
STN 35,871 47 0.1% 33,452 93.3% 120 338 182.1% 5,073 8,478 DUB 3,260 9.7%  35,357 43 0.1% 32,971 93.3% 116 334 187% 4,989 8,426 DUB 3,260 9.9% 
VIE 35,217 7,509 21.3% 33,457 95.0% 214 497 131.8% 6,563 8,936 GRZ 7,358 22.0%  24,659 3,232 13.1% 23,821 96.6% 135 422 213% 4,744 5,884 GRZ 6,424 27.0% 
ZRH 34,432 6,287 18.3% 32,433 94.2% 261 449 71.9% 4,227 6,973 STR 6,481 20.0%  24,579 3,181 12.9% 23,438 95.4% 143 342 140% 3,244 4,740 STR 4,850 20.7% 
DUB 34,389 1,051 3.1% 31,262 90.9% 148 420 183.9% 5,912 10,505 BHX 3,225 10.3%  31,656 789 2.5% 29,303 92.6% 116 397 243% 5,728 8,922 BHX 3,224 11.0% 
GVA 34,319 393 1.1% 32,267 94.0% 165 417 152.6% 5,643 8,349 LYS 10,414 32.3%  28,670 256 0.9% 27,204 94.9% 114 372 228% 4,890 6,825 LYS 8,974 33.0% 
BRU 33,536 2,573 7.7% 31,230 93.1% 202 422 108.8% 4,775 7,728 DUS 6,473 20.7%  25,995 1,800 6.9% 25,537 98.2% 137 368 169% 4,104 4,731 DUS 5,454 21.4% 
MAN 31,747 701 2.2% 24,493 77.2% 209 415 98.7% 3,506 13,867 BHX 5,230 21.4%  24,657 481 2.0% 20,854 84.6% 136 355 161% 3,172 8,379 BHX 4,615 22.1% 
Notes: dpax: disrupted passengers, conn: connecting passengers; reloc: relocated passengers; avt0: average original travel time (min) – relocated passengers; avt1: average relocated travel time (min); aggdel: aggregate delay in pax-days 
-relocated passengers; aggdel': aggregate delay in pax-days for all passengers at 23:59 on Tuesday, Feb 5th 2013; alt: main alternate airport; ∆pax: number of relocated passenger departures at the alternate airport.   
Appendix D. Simulation results: Airport closure on Friday, February 8th 2013 between from 00:00 to 23:59 UTC; passenger recovery via airline network. 
Closed All markets 
 
intra-EEA markets 
Airport dpax conn %conn reloc %reloc avt0 avt1 ∆avt% aggdel aggdel' alt. ∆pax %reloc 
 
dpax conn %conn reloc %reloc avt0 avt1 ∆% aggdel aggdel' alt. ∆pax %reloc 
LHR 127,326 16,206 12.7% 94,258 74.0% 423 951 125.0% 34,586 78,702 MAD 6,097 6.4% 
 
61,934 3,015 4.9% 43,429 70.1% 187 837 347.4% 19,592 43,392 FRA 4,875 11.2% 
CDG 95,364 14,287 15.0% 66,798 70.0% 416 817 96.2% 18,573 58,962 ORY 10,763 16.1% 
 
52,129 3,594 6.9% 35,443 68.0% 221 685 209.4% 11,414 34,148 ORY 5,646 15.9% 
FRA 78,412 21,040 26.8% 66,813 85.2% 420 691 64.8% 12,607 29,155 DUS 11,429 17.1% 
 
42,217 7,928 18.8% 36,516 86.5% 222 507 128.7% 7,234 14,966 DUS 7,127 19.5% 
IST 76,768 18,925 24.7% 53,038 69.1% 312 789 152.9% 17,578 50,970 FRA 10,495 19.8% 
 
120 120 100.0% 115 95.8% 413 397 -3.9% -1 7 MUC 55 47.8% 
AMS 70,289 12,583 17.9% 43,454 61.8% 393 832 111.6% 13,244 51,336 CDG 11,203 25.8% 
 
48,116 4,516 9.4% 27,192 56.5% 202 736 263.7% 10,071 39,038 CDG 6,879 25.3% 
MAD 75,761 9,690 12.8% 39,274 51.8% 330 931 182.1% 16,398 66,389 LHR 6,305 16.1% 
 
60,417 4,349 7.2% 29,096 48.2% 196 856 336.2% 13,330 55,611 BCN 5,451 18.7% 
MUC 65,926 13,205 20.0% 53,014 80.4% 244 731 199.7% 17,938 35,106 FRA 11,093 20.9% 
 
49,991 7,795 15.6% 39,425 78.9% 151 707 366.9% 15,214 29,137 FRA 8,781 22.3% 
FCO 58,250 7,410 12.7% 33,968 58.3% 279 960 244.3% 16,065 49,648 CDG 7,546 22.2% 
 
44,553 4,087 9.2% 24,157 54.2% 159 949 498.0% 13,260 41,067 CDG 5,120 21.2% 
LGW 67,330 1,405 2.1% 27,127 40.3% 198 413 108.9% 4,056 61,508 LHR 5,466 20.1% 
 
55,198 835 1.5% 22,234 40.3% 124 346 179.1% 3,430 49,439 LHR 3,780 17.0% 
BCN 68,834 2,145 3.1% 23,603 34.3% 222 900 306.0% 11,117 73,506 MAD 5,476 23.2% 
 
62,033 1,885 3.0% 19,876 32.0% 151 878 480.9% 10,031 67,862 MAD 5,067 25.5% 
DME 52,709 4,291 8.1% 21,034 39.9% 280 532 89.8% 3,675 51,747 SVO 1,390 6.6% 
 
0 0 - 0 - - - - - 0 - 0 0.0% 
SVO 43,188 7,811 18.1% 28,176 65.2% 346 835 141.1% 9,556 31,160 CDG 6,168 21.9% 
 
32 32 100.0% 13 40.6% 538 684 27.1% 1 35 CDG 6 46.2% 
ORY 61,476 1,768 2.9% 31,314 50.9% 183 505 175.5% 6,997 49,868 CDG 11,434 36.5% 
 
48,369 1,617 3.3% 25,970 53.7% 169 513 203.9% 6,210 37,243 CDG 10,714 41.3% 
CPH 44,940 6,047 13.5% 20,152 44.8% 275 867 215.3% 8,283 42,752 FRA 4,689 23.3% 
 
38,182 4,936 12.9% 15,797 41.4% 173 842 388.2% 7,348 38,238 FRA 4,159 26.3% 
ZRH 37,770 6,128 16.2% 30,089 79.7% 297 723 143.3% 8,895 19,291 STR 6,377 21.2% 
 
25,948 2,815 10.8% 19,918 76.8% 154 711 360.4% 7,696 15,746 STR 4,645 23.3% 
GVA 38,192 303 0.8% 19,833 51.9% 208 813 290.0% 8,327 32,796 LYS 4,600 23.2% 
 
31,928 171 0.5% 15,365 48.1% 135 829 516.2% 7,413 29,739 LYS 3,022 19.7% 
MXP 40,622 530 1.3% 16,973 41.8% 276 632 129.2% 4,200 36,915 LIN 2,816 16.6% 
 
29,959 153 0.5% 10,636 35.5% 148 668 352.3% 3,845 30,627 LIN 1,652 15.5% 
STN 37,801 56 0.1% 16,835 44.5% 123 583 374.4% 5,383 35,725 BRS 1,868 11.1% 
 
37,299 51 0.1% 16,548 44.4% 119 576 385.5% 5,258 34,756 BRS 1,868 11.3% 
DUB 38,814 976 2.5% 16,175 41.7% 197 553 179.9% 3,990 36,530 LHR 1,335 8.3% 
 
35,343 658 1.9% 14,122 40.0% 135 523 288.2% 3,811 31,901 STN 1,265 9.0% 
DUS 42,594 2,132 5.0% 27,148 63.7% 194 507 161.8% 5,903 26,344 FRA 8,828 32.5% 
 
33,985 1,480 4.4% 22,067 64.9% 131 481 267.7% 5,365 22,174 FRA 7,326 33.2% 
MAN 35,096 585 1.7% 17,928 51.1% 250 671 168.7% 5,247 29,985 BHX 3,799 21.2% 
 
27,394 443 1.6% 14,277 52.1% 151 648 328.3% 4,926 22,674 BHX 3,040 21.3% 
BRU 34,566 2,039 5.9% 22,262 64.4% 242 575 137.4% 5,142 21,218 DUS 6,434 28.9% 
 
26,628 1,336 5.0% 17,443 65.5% 168 518 208.7% 4,239 17,147 DUS 5,248 30.1% 
VIE 36,249 6,637 18.3% 26,376 72.8% 250 913 266.0% 12,155 25,489 FRA 6,920 26.2% 
 
24,943 2,731 10.9% 17,440 69.9% 166 958 476.2% 9,588 19,793 FRA 5,039 28.9% 
ARN 41,560 3,247 7.8% 12,022 28.9% 240 937 291.2% 5,823 45,175 FRA 2,764 23.0% 
 
37,636 3,028 8.0% 10,063 26.7% 164 928 465.6% 5,336 46,112 FRA 2,579 25.6% 
OSL 48,274 5,465 11.3% 15,015 31.1% 187 875 367.7% 7,172 53,921 FRA 2,948 19.6% 
 
45,277 5,250 11.6% 13,463 29.7% 133 851 538.7% 6,710 53,464 FRA 2,798 20.8% 
Notes: dpax: disrupted passengers, conn: connecting passengers; reloc: relocated passengers; avt0: average original travel time (min) – relocated passengers; avt1: average relocated travel time (min); aggdel: aggregate delay in pax-days 
-relocated passengers; aggdel': aggregate delay in pax-days for all passengers at 23:59 on Saturday, Feb 9th 2013; alt: main alternate airport; ∆pax: number of relocated passenger departures at the alternate airport. 
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Appendix E. Simulation results: Airport closure on Monday, August 5th 2013 between from 00:00 to 23:59 UTC; passenger recovery via airline network. 
Closed All markets 
 
intra-EEA markets 
Airport dpax conn %conn reloc %reloc avt0 avt1 ∆avt% aggdel aggdel' alt. ∆pax %reloc 
 
dpax conn %conn reloc %reloc avt0 avt1 ∆% aggdel aggdel' alt. ∆pax %reloc 
LHR 104,870 15,089 14.4% 53,634 51.1% 328 513 56.4% 6,894 76,573 LGW 3,064 5.7% 56,060 3,389 6.0% 30,213 53.9% 140 368 162.7% 4,779 37,525 LGW 2,397 7.9% 
BCN 99,922 4,951 5.0% 34,891 34.9% 163 734 349.7% 13,837 104,302 FCO 2,950 8.5%  89,620 4,201 4.7% 30,893 34.5% 127 743 483.4% 13,202 91,811 FCO 2,875 9.3% 
IST 96,342 30,295 31.4% 38,984 40.5% 214 457 113.3% 6,567 87,881 SAW 7,992 20.5%  314 314 100.0% 43 13.7% 374 794 112.4% 13 446 ESB 5 11.6% 
LGW 95,763 1,755 1.8% 40,348 42.1% 165 406 146.8% 6,769 86,021 LHR 4,451 11.0%  80849 1141 1.4% 35368 43.7% 135 386 186.0% 6,162 67,778 LTN 3881 11.0% 
CDG 91,878 13,781 15.0% 44,804 48.8% 311 558 79.2% 7,669 73,323 ORY 5,618 12.5%  51,579 3,623 7.0% 27,093 52.5% 164 449 173.1% 5,358 37,637 ORY 4,092 15.1% 
FRA 81,803 27,826 34.0% 50,380 61.6% 324 711 119.4% 13,548 56,850 MUC 12,158 24.1%  45,852 13,248 28.9% 30,705 67.0% 185 546 195.2% 7,696 28,972 MUC 8,123 26.5% 
PMI 78,869 1,856 2.4% 23,621 29.9% 141 846 498.6% 11,557 88,888 TXL 2,816 11.9%  78,489 1,854 2.4% 23,573 30.0% 141 846 501.5% 11,542 87,883 TXL 2,807 11.9% 
FCO 78,560 13,998 17.8% 34,651 44.1% 189 582 208.6% 9,464 71,778 LIN 2,790 8.1%  60,576 8,227 13.6% 29,464 48.6% 139 565 307.6% 8,725 51,297 LIN 2,568 8.7% 
AMS 76,670 15,854 20.7% 32,120 41.9% 234 497 111.9% 5,850 69,045 BRU 5,137 16.0%  54,946 7437 13.5% 24,609 44.8% 155 441 184.8% 4,885 46,044 BRU 3,694 15.0% 
MUC 69,552 17,502 25.2% 46,468 66.8% 223 658 194.9% 14,037 45,106 FRA 14,589 31.4%  49,344 10,344 21.0% 34,572 70.1% 148 614 315.8% 11,201 31,205 FRA 10,506 30.4% 
MAD 67,401 9,092 13.5% 27,103 40.2% 248 672 170.7% 7,980 61,602 BCN 1,560 5.8%  52753 4238 8.0% 21680 41.1% 154 620 302.8% 7,020 47,982 BCN 1480 6.8% 
ORY 65,673 2,287 3.5% 29,942 45.6% 158 491 210.1% 6,918 58,557 CDG 7,352 24.6%  52069 1971 3.8% 23910 45.9% 146 457 212.5% 5,161 44,969 CDG 5889 24.6% 
DME 63,570 5,793 9.1% 22,597 35.5% 239 469 96.4% 3,614 67,218 VKO 1,345 6.0%  5 5 100.0% 0 0.0% - - - 0 - - 0 0.0% 
STN 60,119 35 0.1% 14,077 23.4% 137 641 367.2% 4,922 69,362 LGW 2,173 15.4%  57,828 32 0.1% 13,084 22.6% 127 640 405.6% 4,665 67,456 DUB 1,972 15.1% 
SVO 51,568 14,429 28.0% 18,394 35.7% 299 517 72.7% 2,778 51,933 LED 2,526 13.7%  42 42 100.0% 13 31.0% 456 503 10.4% 0 51 MUC 3 23.1% 
DUS 50,463 3532 7.0% 30,756 60.9% 179 515 187.2% 7,162 32,624 FRA 7,558 24.6%  37,252 2166 5.8% 24,267 65.1% 129 468 263.8% 5,716 24,300 FRA 5,611 23.1% 
MAN 50,133 935 1.9% 25,398 50.7% 196 579 195.1% 6,753 42,461 BHX 4,789 18.9%  40,555 600 1.5% 22,244 54.8% 151 569 277.9% 6,465 31,679 BHX 4,397 19.8% 
DUB 49,935 1719 3.4% 16,835 33.7% 159 603 279.2% 5,194 52,479 STN 1,371 8.1%  45,112 902 2.0% 15,327 34.0% 119 602 405.0% 5,137 43,611 STN 1,371 8.9% 
BRU 47,864 3909 8.2% 22,958 48.0% 203 567 178.8% 5,795 39,451 AMS 4,578 19.9%  36,118 2614 7.2% 17,577 48.7% 154 561 263.8% 4,968 30,572 AMS 3,653 20.8% 
CPH 47,648 6,188 13.0% 17,576 36.9% 197 745 278.8% 6,694 48,780 OSL 1,891 10.8%  39,425 4,385 11.1% 15,162 38.5% 150 737 390.9% 6,180 39,146 ARN 1,720 11.3% 
ZRH 46,231 7645 16.5% 25,070 54.2% 206 463 124.7% 4,476 32,702 STR 4,215 16.8%  33,407 4059 12.2% 19,474 58.3% 140 443 215.6% 4,093 23,121 STR 3,566 18.3% 
OSL 45,568 5,990 13.1% 15,148 33.2% 175 728 315.8% 5,818 48,141 CPH 2,306 15.2%  41,232 5,457 13.2% 14,130 34.3% 150 722 381.9% 5,612 45,224 CPH 2,276 16.1% 
MXP 44,969 546 1.2% 16,923 37.6% 249 532 113.6% 3,324 43,324 NCE 1,823 10.8%  32,353 145 0.4% 10,584 32.7% 139 493 253.6% 2,597 32,868 NCE 1,477 14.0% 
VIE 41,088 9,736 23.7% 20,440 49.7% 189 469 147.8% 3,969 30,894 FRA 1,815 8.9%  28,250 4,227 15.0% 15,869 56.2% 140 433 209.6% 3,229 20,023 FRA 1,405 8.9% 
ARN 40,453 3,358 8.3% 12,721 31.4% 195 832 327.1% 5,630 43,358 CPH 2,729 21.5%  35,061 2,726 7.8% 11,143 31.8% 155 819 428.6% 5,136 39,351 CPH 2,453 22.0% 
Notes: dpax: disrupted passengers, conn: connecting passengers; reloc: relocated passengers; avt0: average original travel time (min) – relocated passengers; avt1: average relocated travel time (min); aggdel: aggregate delay in pax-days 
-relocated passengers; aggdel': aggregate delay in pax-days for all passengers at 23:59 on Tuesday, Aug 6th 2013; alt: main alternate airport; ∆pax: number of relocated passenger departures at the alternate airport.     
Appendix F. IATA Airport codes 
Code Airport Code Airport Code Airport Code Airport Code Airport 
ACH Altenrhein (Switzerland) CPH Copenhagen Kastrup (Denmark) HAD Halmstad (Sweden) MLH Mulhouse (France) SCN Saarbruecken (Germany) 
AGB Munich Augsburg (Germany) CRL Brussels S. Charleroi (Belgium) HAM Hamburg (Germany) MMX Malmo (Sweden) SEN London Southend (UK) 
AMS Amsterdam (Netherlands) CTA Catania (Italy) HEL Helsinki (Finland) MST Maastricht/Aachen (Netherlands) SLM Salamanca (Spain) 
ARN Stockholm Arlanda (Sweden) DLE Dole (France) HHN Frankfurt Hahn (Germany) MUC Munich International (Germany) SOU Southampton (UK) 
BCN Barcelona (Spain) DME Moscow Domodedovo (Russia) HUY Humberside (UK) MXP Milan Malpensa (Italy) STN London Stansted (UK) 
BFS Belfast International (UK) DOL Deauville (France) ILD Lleida (Spain) NCE Nice (France) STR Stuttgart (Germany) 
BGY Milan Bergamo/Orio al Serio (Italy) DSA Doncaster/Sheffield (UK) INN Innsbruck (Austria) NCY Annecy (France) SVO Moscow Sheremetyevo (Russia) 
BHD Belfast George Best City (UK) DUB Dublin (Ireland) IST Istanbul Ataturk (Turkey) NRK Norrkoping (Sweden) SVQ Sevilla (Spain) 
BHX Birmingham (UK) DUS Duesseldorf International (Germany) KID Kristianstad (Sweden) NRN Duesseldorf Weeze (Germany) SXB Strasbourg (France) 
BKA Moscow Bykovo (Russia) EIN Eindhoven (Netherlands) LBA Leeds Bradford (UK) NUE Nuremberg (Germany) SZG Salzburg (Austria) 
BLK Blackpool (UK) EMA Nottingham East Midlands (UK) LCY London City (UK) NWI Norwich (UK) TEQ Tekirdag (Turkey) 
BMA Stockholm Bromma (Sweden) ESB Ankara Esenboga (Turkey) LEH Le Havre (France) NYO Stockholm Skavsta (Sweden) TLS Toulouse (France) 
BOH Bournemouth (UK) FCO Rome Fiumicino (Italy) LGW London Gatwick (UK) ORY Paris Orly (France) TRF Oslo Sandefjord-Torp Arpt (Norway) 
BRN Berne Belp (Switzerland) FDH Friedrichshafen (Germany) LHR London Heathrow (UK) OSL Oslo Gardermoen (Norway) TRN Turin Caselle (Italy) 
BRQ Brno (Czech Republic) FKB Karlsruhe/Baden-Baden (Germany) LIL Lille Lesquin (France) OST Oostende/Brugge (Belgium) TUF Tours Val de Loire (France) 
BRS Bristol (UK) FMM Memmingen (Germany) LIN Milan Linate (Italy) OXF Oxford (UK) TXL Berlin Tegel (Germany) 
BRU Brussels (Belgium) FMO Muenster/Osnabrueck (Germany) LPL Liverpool (UK) PAD Paderborn/Lippstadt (Germany) VIE Vienna (Austria) 
BSL Basel (Switzerland) FRA Frankfurt International (Germany) LTN London Luton (UK) PMF Milan Parma (Italy) VKO Moscow Vnukovo (Russia) 
BTS Bratislava (Slovakia) GLO Gloucester/Cheltenham (UK) LTQ Le Touquet-Paris-Plage (France) PMI Palma de Mallorca (Spain) VLY Anglesey (UK) 
BVA Paris Beauvais-Tille (France) GOA Genoa (Italy) LUG Lugano (Switzerland) REU Reus (Spain) VRN Verona Villafranca (Italy) 
CAI Cairo (Egypt) GRO Girona (Spain) LUX Luxembourg (Luxembourg) RKE Copenhagen Roskilde (Denmark) VST Stockholm Vasteras (Sweden) 
CDG Paris Charles de Gaulle (France) GRQ Groningen (Netherlands) LYS Lyon St-exupery (France) RTM Rotterdam (Netherlands) WAT Waterford (Ireland) 
CGN Cologne/Bonn (Germany) GRZ Graz (Austria) MAD Madrid Barajas (Spain) RYG Oslo Moss-rygge (Norway) XCR Paris Chalons-Vatry (France) 
CIA Rome Ciampino (Italy) GVA Geneva (Switzerland) MAN Manchester (GB) (UK) SAW Istanbul Sabiha Gokcen (Turkey) ZRH Zurich (Switzerland) 
 
